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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The New Hampshire Constitution is, in most of its fundamental parts, 
very old.
1
  It is long (nearly 200 articles) and wordy, even by the standards 
of the eighteenth century.  It expresses essential principles in more than 
one place, in more than one way, and in language that to modern eyes is 
more suited to political philosophy than to positive law.  Most of it was 
copied from the original Massachusetts Constitution,
2
 itself based on a 
draft by John Adams.
3
  However, there is no other state in the union with a 
structure of taxing powers and limits comparable to New Hampshire‘s. 
Part I of the New Hampshire Constitution is the Bill of Rights.  Its first 
article declares ―[a]ll men . . . equally free and independent,‖ and ―all gov-
ernment . . . instituted for the general good.‖4  Article 10 reiterates that 
government is ―instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, 
of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of 
any one man, family, or class of men.‖5  Article 12 entitles ―[e]very mem-
ber of the community,‖ to protection ―in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, 
and property,‖ subject to the obligation ―to contribute his share in the ex-
pense of such protection . . . .‖6  These provisions, combined with part II, 
article 5‘s requirement that legislation be ―wholesome and reasonable,‖ 
and ―for the benefit and welfare of this state,‖7 comprehend concepts later 
expressed in the federal Constitution as Substantive Due Process and Equal 
Protection.  Retrospective laws are prohibited.
8
 
The New Hampshire founders had distinct views on the proper ways of 
funding government.  Part II, article 5 requires that ―assessments, rates, 
and taxes,‖ be ―proportional and reasonable . . . .‖9  They gave this prin-
ciple particular content by rejecting the clause of their Massachusetts mod-
  
 * Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center.  This article grew out of orientation presentations 
requested by the Ways and Means Committee of the New Hampshire House of Representatives in 2008 
and 2009. 
 1. The revolution was waged by a provisional government with ―undefined and boundless authori-
ty, hastily assumed and arbitrarily exercised, for the transient purpose of the war . . . .‖  Gould v. Ray-
mond, 59 N.H. 260, 272 (1879).  The permanent constitution, refined and ratified by the people through 
successive rounds of town meetings, became effective in 1784.  State v. Saunders, 66 N.H. 39, 72 
(1889).  A comprehensive set of amendments was ratified in 1792.  Id.  While the 1792 revision was 
quite extensive, it was not strictly a new constitution. 
 2. State v. U.S. & Can. Express Co. (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 248–49 (1880). 
 3. 4 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR 215–16 (1851). 
 4. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 1 (1784). 
 5. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 10. 
 6. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12. 
 7. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5. 
 8. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23. 
 9. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5. 
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el authorizing excise taxes.
10
  Taxation was permitted only on polls and 
―estates‖ (meaning property owned, possessed, or enjoyed).11  This was 
reiterated in the original language of part II, article 6 governing modes and 
frequency of assessment.
12
  They also omitted language authorizing the 
colonial practice of taxing ―faculty,‖ the capacity to earn income.13  For 
over a century, the property tax for each unit of government was just that—
the property tax—a single, broad levy at one uniform rate on specified real 
and personal property. 
Despite one significant constitutional amendment
14
 and considerable 
evolution in judicial interpretation, it is still the case that true taxes must be 
on polls or property.  New Hampshire remains unique among the states in 
denying the legislature the power to levy excise taxes as such.
15
  Conse-
quently, while occasionally used, persuasive authority from other states 
and general treatises are often irrelevant, misleading, or double-edged.
16
  
Modern ―taxes‖ not levied ad valorem on some class of property must be 
justified under some other power (as, for example, fees to recover costs, 
  
 10. State v. U.S. & Can. Express Co. (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 239 (1880).  The excise article 
was also missing from Adams‘s original draft.  4 ADAMS, supra note 3, at 233 n.3.  Hostility to excises 
was part of an established political tradition in England as well as the Colonies.  Viewed as oppressive 
and a source of systematic corruption, their abolition was repeatedly demanded under the English 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., J. Rushworth, Heads of the Proposals Offered by the Army, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1625–1660 324 (Samuel Rawson Gar-
diner ed., 2d ed. 1899).  Dr. Johnson‘s famous dictionary defines excise as ―a hateful tax levied upon 
commodities . . . .‖  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unpaginated) 
(facsimile reprint 1990) (London, 1755).  In its address inviting Quebec to join the colonial resistance, 
the Continental Congress referred to the excise as ―the horror of all free states.‖  THE FOUNDERS‘ 
CONSTITUTION ch. 14, doc. 12 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at  
http://press–pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s12.html. 
 11. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 6; Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 126, 127–28, 130 A. 357, 358 (1925). 
 12. ―And, while the public charges of government or any part thereof shall be assessed on polls and 
estates in the manner that has heretofore been practiced, in order that such assessments may be made 
with equality there shall be a valuation of the estates within the state taken anew once in every five 
years, at least, and as much oftener as the general court shall order.‖  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 6. 
 13. MAURICE H. ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF TAXATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 86 (1903); Opinion of 
the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, 593–94, 79 A. 31, 33 (1911).  The implication of this omission was not at 
first realized.  In 1784 the first assessment statute after adoption of the constitution retained ―faculty,‖ 
but it was omitted in 1789 and did not reappear.  Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. at 595, 79 A. at 33. 
 14. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 6 (amended 1903) (permitting taxation of ―other classes of property‖). 
 15. The constitutional amendment of 1903 authorizing taxes on ―other classes of property‖ permits 
what I call quasi-excises: 
In the sense that they are dynamic rather than static, that their incidence is dependent upon the 
happening of an event rather than upon the mere existence of property, they may properly enough 
be classed as excises.  In the features of being laid upon property and ad valorem, they are like es-
tate taxes. 
Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 576, 149 A. 321, 330 (1930) (emphasis added); see infra Part 
II.D. 
 16. See, e.g., State v. U.S. & Can. Express Co. (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 249–50 (1880) 
(referencing Chief Justice Doe‘s use of Massachusetts cases upholding taxes under the excise clause to 
demonstrate the unconstitutionality of similar taxes in New Hampshire). 
File: Hurn-Pub-Review-atr.doc Created on:  6/30/2009 11:34:00 AM Last Printed: 5/22/2002 1:17:00 PM 
254 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 3 
special benefit assessments, or penalties).  These non-tax revenues are sub-
ject to their own constitutional constraints and have a complex history.  
Some description of their origin and nature is required to understand taxa-
tion, but full analysis of their current status is deferred to a forthcoming 
article.  The modern tax system would be unrecognizable (and probably 
disturbing) to the founders and the courts of the nineteenth century.  Politi-
cal and economic pressures have led to repeated and increasingly complex 
efforts to mimic excise taxes by defining special classes of property, layer-
ing exemptions and credits, and wielding other revenue powers.  Along the 
way several narrow constitutional amendments have permitted or con-
strained particular taxes or policies.
17
 
II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: FOUR PERIODS 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court regularly cites tax opinions as far 
back as 1829, with little indication of any legal discontinuities.  However, 
the constitutional law of New Hampshire taxation shows four distinct pe-
riods of increasing complexity.  Only a few general principles survive from 
the earlier cases, and many specific holdings have been overturned, often 
indirectly or tacitly.
18
  Some early general statements have been given new, 
very different meanings.  The citations to old cases are a tribute to the 
court‘s determination to maintain principled consistency with as much of 
the ancient law as possible, but many once-critical distinctions have been 
swept away.  The modern court is usually much more deferential to legisla-
tive judgment than its predecessors.  Because decisions from before 1940 
are as likely to mislead as to enlighten the reader, some sense of the spirit 
of each era and the turning points will reduce the risk of confusion.  More-
over, the modern law is encrusted with bland generalities and string cita-
tions
19
 that obscure issues, some of them unresolved.  The peculiarities of 
  
 17. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 83 (amended 1877) (prohibiting use of tax money for religious schools); 
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5 (amended 1942) (permitting special assessments, rates and taxes on growing 
wood and timber); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5-b (amended 1968) (real estate may be valued based on 
current use); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 6-a (amended 1938) (revenue from automobile registrations, 
licenses, gasoline taxes, etc. dedicated solely to highway purposes). 
 18. Changes have often been indirect or tacit.  As a result, the signals in citation services are not 
reliable—independent examination of later citations is recommended. 
 19. For example, in 1997, after a long, citation-studded survey of general principles derived from 
the main sources and limits of taxing authority, the court concluded: ―Together, these three constitu-
tional provisions require that taxation be just, uniform, equal, and proportional; in addition, our consti-
tution demands that classifications be made between types of property, not taxpayers.‖  Smith v. N.H. 
Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 686, 692 A.2d 486, 491 (1997).  In the author‘s experience, 
this offers little practical guidance to legislative committees. 
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current law make little sense without an understanding of the logic and the 
concrete cases through which they evolved. 
A. 1784–1880: The Age of Innocence 
From the adoption of the constitution to 1902, there was one principal 
property tax supporting each level of government.  The legislature added 
and varied items to be included, set uniform statutory valuations for some 
of them, and experimented with exemptions to encourage various indus-
tries.  From the beginning there was also an ―excise‖ on alcoholic beverag-
es and assorted other levies indifferently called taxes or fees that, while 




Until 1829, there was little opportunity for the courts to test legislation 
against the tax philosophy embedded in the constitution.
21
  In that year, the 
Supreme Court of Judicature took the occasion of an advisory opinion 
about a proposed local road tax to write a comprehensive dissertation on 
the constitutional framework.
22
  The opinion has been regularly cited down 
to modern times.
23
  At least four enduring propositions were developed.  
First, the ―supreme legislative power . . . vested in the senate and house of 
representatives‖24 to ―establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable . . 
. laws . . . for the benefit and welfare of this state,‖25 is not plenary in mat-
ters of taxation, but is limited to ―proportional and reasonable‖ levies on 
the specific subjects mentioned in part II, articles 5 and 6—at that time, 
only ―polls and estates.‖26  Second, ―proportional‖ means ―the same tax 
shall be laid, upon the same amount of property, in every part of the [juris-
diction levying it].‖27  Third, the additional term ―reasonable‖ adds some-
thing beyond mathematical proportionality, permitting variation to make 
taxes ―just . . . so that each individual‘s just share, and no more, shall fall 
upon him.‖28  Fourth, ―a very considerable latitude of discretion must be 
  
 20. See generally ROBINSON, supra note 13. 
 21. ―The legislature exercised judicial power after the adoption of the constitution, as they did 
before, in reversing judgments and granting new trials: and that illegal procedure was not discontinued 
until it had flourished, under constitutional prohibition, for the space of thirty-four years.‖  State v. 
Express, 60 N.H. 219, 248 (1880) (citing Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818)). 
 22. Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565 (1829). 
 23. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353 
(1997); Smith, 141 N.H. at 681, 692 A.2d at 486. 
 24. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 2. 
 25. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5. 
 26. Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. at 566. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 569.  Other than the exemption of infants and idiots from the poll tax, the justices gave no 
indication how a ―just share‖ differs from mathematical proportionality.  Id. at 570. 
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left to the legislature . . . as to the selection of proper subjects of taxation 
and the proportion of the tax that shall be laid on each subject . . . .‖29 
The rise of business corporations, particularly railroads, telegraph 
companies, and various types of banks or insurance companies, strained 
the simple system.  Was the property of a corporation to be taxed to the 
shareholders, to the corporation, to both, or somehow apportioned?
30
  What 
if the corporation itself owned shares?
31
  The full value of the tangible 
property of network industries and the intangible property of moneyed 
corporations could not reasonably be assessed and taxed by particular 
towns.  The statutes of the mid-nineteenth century are strewn with experi-
ments raising revenue from these industries by statewide levies in addition 
to, or in lieu of, localized taxes on tangible property.
32
  The courts became 
increasingly concerned about double taxation and the actual incidence of 
various taxes. 
In surveying this period (as he joined in bringing it to a close), Chief 
Justice Doe wrote: 
Inequality of operation, gradually introduced by new subjects of 
taxation, and by increased differences in the values and varieties of 
old ones, has been met by legislative efforts to rectify the wrong.  
Such changes have taken place that methods of dividing the public 
expense, equitable enough for practical purposes in the last cen-
tury, would now be good cause of complaint.  A great mass of 
questions of constitutional administration, to be raised by the 
progress of society, and the enlarged and complicated industries 




B. 1880–1903: New Rigor, Powers and Limits Refined 
In 1880, the New Hampshire Supreme Court began to strictly define 
proportionality and to strike down or advise against
34
 a great deal of legis-
  
 29. Id. at 570. 
 30. Smith v. Burley, 9 N.H. 423 (1838); see also Cheshire County Tel. Co. v. State, 63 N.H. 167 
(1884); Robinson v. Dover, 59 N.H. 521 (1880). 
 31. Nashua Sav. Bank v. City of Nashua, 46 N.H. 389 (1866). 
 32. This history is somewhat surveyed in Wyatt v. State Board of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 70 A. 
387 (1908), where it became necessary to determine whether the savings bank deposit tax was a proper-
ty tax, in order to determine the proper formula for assessing the railroad tax. 
 33. State v. U.S. & Can. Express Co. (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 247 (1880). 
 34. As economic and political demands for legislation increasingly ran afoul of constitutional limits, 
the House and Senate began to invoke part II, article 74 of the New Hampshire Constitution to secure 
advisory opinions on proposed legislation.  Their precedential value is somewhat qualified: 
The true standing to be ascribed to them seems to be that while they are persuasive they are 
not controlling; and their persuasive value may be greater or less, as the circumstances under 
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lation.  In that year, it declared three tax statutes unconstitutional,
35
 and 
two years later another.
36
  It also began to develop the criteria for tax ex-
emptions and the constitutional bases and limits for revenues that could be 
raised without qualifying as taxes. 
The decisive step was taken in State v. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 
when the court struck down a ―license‖ fee of 2% on the gross revenues of 
express companies.
37
  Although still cited and regarded as fundamental, by 
normal standards State v. Express should have had little precedential value.  
There was no opinion of the court.  Two Justices did not sit, two wrote 
individual opinions, and the others concurred only in the result without 
opinion.  The opinions of Justice Stanley and Chief Justice Doe display 
quite different approaches to the relevant constitutional provisions.  Subse-
quent decisions long reflected Stanley‘s attitude toward proportionality.  
Doe‘s lasting contribution was to ground many exemptions and substantial 




The attorney general argued that modern conditions required the court 
to recognize it had been wrong in 1829—that the legislative power to tax 
was not intended to be limited to proportional levies on polls and estates, 
but extended to ―privilege‖ taxes on business.  This was demonstrated by a 
century of business licensing and business taxes assessed at fixed sums or 
according to income.
39
  The state maintained there was no difference be-
tween a license fee and a tax.
40
 
Both Justice Stanley and Chief Justice Doe believed that there was a 
difference, and that despite its terminology this statute‘s object was ―to 
raise revenue by taxation.‖41 
That made the case easy for Justice Stanley.  He adhered to the prevail-
ing view that the references to polls and estates in part II, articles 5 and 6 
  
which they were rendered show finality of judgment or the reverse in the minds of their au-
thors. 
Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 583, 149 A. 321, 333 (1930).  They comprise, by far, the bulk of 
the court‘s analysis in this field and are rarely renounced. 
 35. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. v. State, 60 N.H. 87 (1880) (railroad tax disproportional to 
extent it was a state tax); Berlin Mills Co. v. Wentworth‘s Location, 60 N.H. 156 (1880) (taxation of 
property in unincorporated place by adjacent town); State v. Express, 60 N.H. 219 (1880) (levy on 
gross receipts of railroad express companies). 
 36. Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624 (1882) (legacy and succession tax). 
 37. 60 N.H. at 24850. 
 38. This expression, rooted in the social contract language of articles 10 and 12 of the New Hamp-
shire Bill of Rights, emphasizes that the New Hampshire legislature has never exercised sovereign 
prerogatives, only delegated powers subject to express reservations. 
 39. State v. Express, 60 N.H. at 228. 
 40. Id. at 224–25. 
 41. Id. at 234 (Stanley, J.); see also id. at 262–63 (Doe, C.J.). 
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were exclusive, limiting the legislature‘s more general powers.42  There-
fore, the statute was obviously unconstitutional in several ways: it taxed 
only express business carried by railroads, not other express business; it 
was not a ―tax on property, or on polls or estates,‖ because it did ―not re-
gard the capital invested, the expenses incurred, or the losses sustained;‖ 
and if it were, it could not be reasonable and proportional because it was 
―not on net profits, but on gross receipts.‖43  It would also be a double-tax 
on the income producing power of property already taxed at full value.
44
  
Justice Stanley also presumed that if a business tax were permissible, it 
necessarily would have to be ―on all business alike.‖45 
Chief Justice Doe had a very different constitutional theory.  He did 
not consider the references to polls and estates in part II, articles 5 and 6 to 
be exclusive.
46
  The omission of the excise clause was not meaningful—
there was a plenary taxing power limited only by the more general clauses 
of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights, ―the tax power of New Hampshire is 
included in the grant of the supreme legislative power (subject to the limi-
tation of equality on which the whole government is founded) . . . .‖47  He 
thought business taxes, even on particular industries, could be constitution-
ally equal if assuredly passed along to consumers.  In the previous year he 
had taken a dramatic position: 
It is the consumer or user who pays the tax laid upon the man-
ufacture, production, or importation of personal property, whether 
the tax is assessed by statute to him, or to the manufacturer, pro-
ducer, or importer . . . .  Legislative power may reenact the law of 
nature by assessing the taxes of manufactured and imported goods 
upon the consumer and the land-tax upon the tenant, or assess the 
former upon the manufacturer and importer and the latter upon the 
owner, and leave the law of nature, without reenactment, to em-
ploy the manufacturer, importer, and landlord as tax-collectors . . . 
. 
  
 42. Id. at 235. 
 43. Id. at 244.  Both sub-classification and measurement by gross receipts are now permissible as a 
result of the 1903 amendment to part II, article 6. 
 44. Id. at 245.  As will appear later in this article, while ―double taxation‖ remains a concern, the 
1903 amendment permits taxes on the income generated by property, in addition to those on the posses-
sion of the same property. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 250 (Doe, C.J.). 
 47. Id. at 249.  Doe‘s view seems to have later contributed to an ambivalence in the court‘s analysis 
in Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624 (1882), which held the legacy and succession tax unconstitutional 
under part II, article 5 if characterized as a property tax and hypothetically, at least under the New 
Hampshire Bill of Rights, a tax on a civil right or privilege. 
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Whether the public expense is more justly and wisely divided 
by an inevitably unsuccessful effort to tax all property, or by the 
taxation of some class or classes of property that can be easily, 
equally, and certainly taxed, and the tax of which is equitably col-
lected for the public from all classes of people by the higher gov-
ernment, is not a judicial question.  If there is a class of property, 
the tax of which, by force of the natural law of tax distribution and 
equalization, would be eventually paid in just proportion by the 




Consequently an express company tax could be constitutional if 
designed to be an act of taxation, laying upon railway-express 
transportation a burden to be equally distributed, by natural law, 
among the purchasers of such transportation and their customers, 
as a tax laid on any articles of property is distributed among the 
consumers or users of the article.  The object might be to make the 
expressmen mere collectors of the tax.
49
 
However, the Chief Justice discerned no such design and in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence presumed ―the legislature did not intend to au-
thorize such expressmen either to add to their charges as much as this sta-
tute requires them to pay to the state, or to raise their charges above the 
reasonable standard of the common law.‖50  Without this (and without the 
possible police power justifications addressed below) the tax failed, what-
ever its classification: 
Whether it is a tax imposed upon person, property, income, busi-
ness, gross receipts, profits, or earnings, is immaterial.  It is a tax 
which one class of men are required to pay, and from which all 




What of the array of income-based assessments of businesses, license 
fees, and industry-specific exemptions cited by the attorney general that 
appeared to fall short of the constitutional standard?  Justice Stanley dis-
  
 48. Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 555–56 (1879).  After Morrison (in which it was dicta), 
this view never secured a majority of the court, and Chief Justice Doe appears to have thereafter de-
ferred to his colleagues‘ more conservative position.  However, in the modern world of quasi-excises 
on ―classes of property,‖ his original conception may give both comfort and guidance to courts deter-
mining the justice of particular classifications. 
 49. State v. Express, 60 N.H. at 262 (Doe, C.J.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 263. 
File: Hurn-Pub-Review-atr.doc Created on:  6/30/2009 11:34:00 AM Last Printed: 5/22/2002 1:17:00 PM 
260 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 3 
posed of the first by showing the income provisions to be merely methods 
of determining the value of property: ―Ferries, wharves, and mills are tang-
ible; and their value can be estimated in different ways, either by taking 
their income, or the market or salable value, as the basis.‖52 
Chief Justice Doe cautiously discounted the value of early practices as 
evidence of constitutional intent by contemporaneous construction,
53
 and 
dealt with the remainder through an elaborate explication of the protective 
power as an alternative to the taxing power. 
An act entitled an act of taxation may be valid, although not an 
exercise of the power of collecting the constitutional shares of ex-
pense.  The title may be an immaterial misnomer and error of form 
only, and the act may be an exercise of some of the other powers 
which provide for the common benefit, protection, and security, 
and which may be conveniently grouped under the name of the 
protective power.  A fine, imposed by this power, is practically as 
useful to the government as a tax of equal amount; and a protective 
law is not invalid merely because it produces public revenue.
54
 
This disposed of the so-called excise on intoxicating liquor,
55
 the dog 
tax,
56
 the lightning rod salesman‘s tax,57 other peddlers‘ taxes,58 and the 
like.  He could have justified 
a railroad-express tax law, so called . . . designed to be an act of dis-
couragement, like a liquor excise . . . to discourage the employment of 
railroad expressmen by increasing their rates, and to encourage other 
carriers who cannot successfully compete with railroad expressmen 




 52. Id. at 239 (Stanley, J.). 
 53. Id. at 246–47 (Doe, C.J.).  Doe believed the founding generation frequently did not apprehend 
the full meaning of the constitutional principles and language they adopted.  Id. at 247–48.  For exam-
ple, slaves were held and taxed for some years before it was realized that the New Hampshire Bill of 
Rights had abolished slavery.  Id. at 248.  Similarly, during the constitution‘s first four decades, the 
legislature reversed judgments and granted new trials, contrary to the separation of powers mandated in 
part I, article 37.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 257. 
 55. Id. at 257–58. 
 56. Id. at 260. 
 57. Id. at 261.  This was a common source of consumer fraud at the time.  As the tax discriminated 
between citizens of New Hampshire and those of other states, it was ultimately held unconstitutional.  
State v. Wiggin, 64 N.H. 508, 15 A. 128 (1888). 
 58. State v. Express, 60 N.H. at 261 (Doe, C.J.).  Peddling was strictly regulated and had been en-
tirely prohibited in the founding era.  State v. Angelo, 71 N.H. 224, 51 A. 905 (1902). 
 59. State v. Express, 60 N.H. at 261–62 (Doe, C.J.). 
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The Chief Justice, however, did not discern, and declined to presume, such 
a purpose.
60
  Also, taking it at face value, Justice Stanley declined to con-
sider whether the statute ―could be regarded as an exercise of the police 
power.‖61 
That left the problem of exemptions.  Industry-specific exemptions 
from the general property tax were apparent violations of proportionality.  
These seemed different from the implicit exemption of types of property 
by omission from the taxable list.
62
  In the latter sense, ―the selection of 
proper subjects of taxation‖ had long been held a necessary legislative pre-
rogative,
63
 but having once taxed manufacturing property generally, how 
could the legislature exempt such industries like linseed oil mills, plating 
iron mills, and factories for the manufacture of cotton, woolen yarn, and 
cloth?
64
  As straight-forward bounties, Chief Justice Doe said that a subsi-
dy to promote desirable activities was as much within the protective power, 
as a penalty to discourage the undesirable.
65
  A tax exemption was simply 
an efficient type of direct subsidy: 
The protective power has been exercised by giving bounties of ex-
emption from taxation, as well as by giving bounties of money ob-
tained by taxation.  The generation by whom the constitution was 
adopted understood the state could pay a sum of money to an indi-
vidual, for a public purpose, by exempting him from the payment 
of the same amount of tax.  They did not understand there would 
be any constitutional virtue in going through the form of collecting 
money from him, and immediately paying it back to him.
66
 
Otherwise, disproportionate exemptions within classes of taxed property 
may be justified as expenditures for a public purpose.  The court closed the 
logical circle later in 1880: ―Every exemption is an indirect tax upon other 
property, and can only be justified where a direct tax upon other property 
in its behalf would be within the power of the legislature.‖67 
  
 60. Id. at 262.  This unwillingness to indulge in saving assumptions stands in marked contrast to the 
modern practice.  Modern standards of review are discussed infra Part III, particularly sections D and 
F. 
 61. Id. at 233 (Stanley, J.). 
 62. This is a recurring problem in the modern era, as will appear several times below.  The signific-
ance of the distinction is addressed infra Part III.D. 
 63. Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565, 570 (1829). 
 64. State v. Express, 60 N.H. at 259 (Doe, C.J.). 
 65. Id. at 260. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Franklin St. Soc‘y v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342, 345–46 (1880) (no implied or constitutionally 
required exemption of church property).  There is no general establishment clause in the New Hamp-
shire Constitution.  Federal First Amendment theory does not treat a non-discriminatory religious 
exemption as a subsidy.  The more general proposition stated was overbroad, even at the time—a great 
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Despite pejorative rhetoric in both opinions about taxes on particular 
businesses, State v. Express did not hold them unconstitutional.  Earlier in 
the same term, the court indicated how a flawed, statewide tax on railroad 
property could be made constitutional by substituting a statewide uniform 
assessment and rate for a patchwork levy, based on assessments and rates 
in various towns where the railroad had property.
68
  ―[T]he rule of unifor-
mity is coextensive with the territory to which a tax applies, and prevents 
unjust discriminations.  A state tax must be uniform throughout the state, a 
county tax throughout the county, a town tax throughout the town.‖69  The 
hint was promptly taken and the statute amended in 1881 to levy the rail-
road tax in proportion to the statewide average of other property taxes.
70
  
On the same day, a new 1% levy on the property of telegraph companies 
(which had formerly been a 2% gross receipts tax) was converted to one 
―as near as may be in proportion to the taxation of other property through-
out the state.‖71  The legislature had made statewide assessment and aver-
aging possible by creating, in 1878, a state board of equalization.
72
  This 
became the generally accepted method of taxing business at the state level.  
A matching tax was levied on telephone companies in 1883,
73
 on express 
companies and sleeping, dining, and parlor cars in 1907,
74
 and on the in-
tangible value of electric utility franchises in 1931.
75
  All these taxes were 
at the same rate. 
No reference was made in State v. Express (or any other opinion before 
the constitutional amendment of 1903) to Opinion of the Justices, 53 N.H. 
634 (1866), which apparently upheld an income tax of 25% on ―all in-
comes received . . . during the year previous, accruing from notes, bonds, 
or any other securities whatsoever, not otherwise taxed . . . .‖76  The court 
  
deal of property remained untaxed at various times simply as a matter of practicality.  See Opinion of 
the Court, 4 N.H. at 565; see also Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 555–56 (1879). 
 68. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. v. State, 60 N.H. 87 (1880). 
 69. Id. at 95. 
 70. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 115–16. 
 71. Id. at 122–23. 
 72. Id. at 115, 220. 
 73. Id. at 123. 
 74. Wyatt v. State Bd. of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 552–53, 70 A. 387, 388 (1908). 
 75. See Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 101 N.H. 154, 136 A.2d 600 (1957).  This tax had been 
generally approved the prior year in Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (1930). 
 76. Opinion of the Justices, 53 N.H. 634, 635 (1866) (Published several years out of sequence in the 
Official Reporter.  Notable discrepancies between date of decision and sequence in the Reports, partic-
ularly for advisory opinions, lasted well into the twentieth century.).  This tax could have been sus-
tained as a property tax, taxing (once) property acquired after the annual tax day for the general proper-
ty tax.  However, it was not proportional according to the view prevailing after State v. Express because 
it was levied at a rate different from the rate for other property.  In the one subsequent case, Opinion of 
the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311 (1915), the majority adopted the view that this opinion had actual-
ly affirmed the constitutionality of the tax as a tax on property.  Perhaps because it appeared to extend 
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at that time saw ―nothing in the form in which the tax is to be assessed and 
raised, nor in the general description of the property proposed to be taxed, 
that can be alleged as a legal objection to the validity of the law.‖77  This 
cannot be reconciled with State v. Express and its kin.  It would be decades 
before such a view was again expressed by a majority of the court.
78
  From 
1880 to at least 1923, it was generally believed that all property taxes at a 
given level of government had to be levied not only ad valorem, but also at 
the same rate and valuation.
79
 
This model could not be reconciled with existing taxes on banks and 
insurance companies.  These were levied as percentages of deposits, capi-
tal, premiums, and the like.  Such taxes at fixed rates necessarily differed 
from the annually floating rate of the basic property tax, and the bases were 
not all easily described as property or estates.  Their existence was one 
basis of the attorney general‘s argument for a plenary taxing power in both 
Boston, Concord & Montreal Railroad v. State and State v. Express.
80
 
Most of these were rationalized, albeit at the cost of confirming an al-
ternative revenue theory—the concept of a voluntary payment for an ac-
cepted privilege.  As such, the tax on commercial banks had already been 
removed from the ―true‖ tax category: 
It has been argued that the annual payment of one per cent. on 
the capital of banks required to be paid to the literary fund is in 
substance a double tax.  But it is not named nor assessed as a tax; it 
is a fixed sum paid yearly, and not varying in amount like other 
taxes, according as they are voted in different places and in differ-
ent years; and has more the character of a bonus voluntarily paid 




The tax of 1% on the premiums paid to foreign insurance companies was 
expressly structured as a condition voluntarily accepted, to secure the li-
  
to U.S. securities exempt under the U.S. Constitution, the tax seems not to have been put into effect.  It 
is not mentioned in MAURICE H. ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF TAXATION IN NEW HAMPSHIRE (1903). 
 77. Opinion of the Justices, 53 N.H. at 635 (out of chronological sequence in the Official Reports). 
 78. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 611, 93 A. at 311.  The court cited the 1866 opinion in sup-
port of an income tax, but even then the proposed tax was to float at the same rate as the general prop-
erty tax, not at a separate, fixed rate.  Id. at 617, 93 A. 314. 
 79. Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 120 A. 629 (1923) (interest and dividend income were 
taxable, but only at the uniform rate).  A different rate for income taxes was not approved until Opinion 
of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927). 
 80. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. v. State, 60 N.H. 87, 92 (1880); State v. U.S. & Can. Express 
Co. (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 224–33 (1880). 
 81. Nashua Sav. Bank v. City of Nashua, 46 N.H. 389, 399 (1866); accord Rockingham Ten Cent 
Sav. Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N.H. 17 (1872); Wyatt v. State Bd. of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 70 A. 
387 (1908). 
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cense to do business in New Hampshire.
82
  It stood unchallenged until 
1937, when the supreme court ratified this view:  
The ―tax‖ imposed in 1869 [on foreign insurance company 
premiums], whatever its name, appears, at least until the constitu-
tional amendment of 1903, to have been unsustainable as a tax.  
But it was sustainable as a condition for prosecuting business in 
New Hampshire in somewhat the same manner as the gasoline 




In 1896, a requirement that railroads pay statutorily defined excess 
profits into the state treasury was sustained against taking and dispropor-
tionality attacks on the same basis—it was a condition on privileges volun-
tarily assumed by railroads.
84
 
Unfortunately, the very lucrative
85
 tax on savings bank deposits had 
been repeatedly and explicitly held to be a property tax.
86
  The savings 
bank tax could not be fit into the court‘s constitutional framework until 
1927, when the constitutional amendment of 1903 was interpreted to per-
mit different tax rates on different classes of property.
87
  The nineteenth-
century court frankly admitted this and ―grandfathered‖ the tax with a 
combination of prescription and necessity: ―The savings-bank tax . . . is an 
anomaly, resting on peculiar grounds of public policy, and is universally 
understood to have acquired the position of an exception to the constitu-
tional rule of equality.‖88 
Modest license charges needed no privilege theory or special protec-
tive power analysis, so long as they were ―merely an equivalent for the 
service rendered‖ in a legitimate regulatory scheme.89  Throughout this era, 
there were also anomalous fees or taxes on certain corporations when char-
tered or re-capitalized on the basis of amount of authorized capital, with 
declining rates as capitalization increased.
90
  Such graduation was not con-
sistent with the fee theory and was impermissibly disproportional in a true 
tax.  Nor is it clear that it could have been justified under the police power 
  
 82. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 119. 
 83. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 89 N.H. 21, 29, 192 A. 297, 301 (1937) (citation omitted). 
 84. State v. Manchester & Lawrence R.R., 69 N.H. 35, 38 A. 736 (1897). 
 85. In 1877, it produced over $30 million.  ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 118.  By 1893, it produced 
over twice as much as the taxes on tangible personal property and more than half the total taxes for all 
real estate.  Id. 
 86. Nashua Sav., 46 N.H. at 398–99; Rockingham Sav., 52 N.H. at 27. 
 87. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927). 
 88. Boston, Concord & Montreal R.R. v. State, 62 N.H. 648, 649 (1883); see also Wyatt v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 556, 70 A. 387, 390 (1908). 
 89. State v. Forcier, 65 N.H. 42, 42, 17 A. 577, 577 (1889) (apothecary and druggist license). 
 90. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 126–27. 
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or as a condition on a privilege.
91
  However, the court was not called on to 




After State v. Express, there was one more dramatic nineteenth-century 
tax case.  In 1879, the legislature adopted a death duty on legacies and suc-
cessions.
93
  The rate was 1%, with an exemption for property passing to 
surviving spouses, children, and grandchildren.  In 1882 the court declared 
it unconstitutional in Curry v. Spencer.
94
  Once again, the court was ambi-
valent about whether there could be taxes on ―privileges,‖ but if there 
could be, the equality and proportionality rules would still govern: 
All measures for the imposition or collection of taxes must 
therefore conform to this general principle of just equality; and 
hence it is immaterial whether the tax imposed by c. 64 is to be re-
garded as a tax on property or upon a civil right or privilege, for 
the same principle of equality and due proportion applies to every 
species of tax alike.
95
 
Either theory left the tax unconstitutional: ―If it is to be regarded as a tax 
on property, it is open to the objection of unequal and double taxation, and 
if it is to be regarded as a tax on a civil right or privilege, it is discriminat-
ing and disproportional.‖96  Nor would a cost-recovery, fee theory save it—
because of the exemptions.
97
  Such exactions must fall proportionally on 
all classes of beneficiaries.
98
 
The requirement that fees be uniform was reemphasized in an 1889 de-
cision that became the lead case in New Hampshire on equal protection in 
general.
99
  The State indicted Dr. Pennoyer for practicing medicine without 
  
 91. Such fees and privilege charges had to be uniform and proportional, apparently without exemp-
tions.  Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624, 631 (1882) (legacy and succession tax unsustainable as a fee to 
support the probate system).  ―If one estate was entitled to be . . . settled [in probate] without payment 
of fee, all were.‖  Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N.H. 89, 97, 65 A. 392, 396 (1906) (sustaining a similar tax 
as authorized by the constitutional amendment of 1903).  It is not clear whether, and if so why, an 
exemption under these theories could not be sustained under a protective power subsidy theory. 
 92. ROBINSON, supra note 13, at 127 (listing amounts realized). 
 93. 1879 N.H. Laws ch. 64, invalidated by Curry v. Spencer, 61 N.H. 624 (1882). 
 94. Curry, 61 N.H. at 631. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  It would be a double property tax because much of the property passing would have already 
paid the annual general property tax.  Id.  It would also be disproportionate because of the exemption of 
surviving spouses, children, and grandchildren.  Id.  This latter view of disproportionality no longer 
prevails because the court accepted a protective power justification in distinguishing charitable or intra-
family transfers.  Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N.H. 89, 65 A. 392 (1906); Estate of Robitaille v. N.H. 
Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 149 N.H. 595, 827 A.2d 981 (2003). 
 97. Curry, 61 N.H. at 631, 632. 
 98. Id. at 632. 
 99. State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 18 A. 878 (1889).  The court stated: 
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a license.
100
  His constitutional objection was that certain practitioners had 
been grandfathered on an arbitrary basis (continuous residence in one 
town) unrelated to qualification.
101
  On a motion to quash, the supreme 
court declared the statute unconstitutional: 
For the right to continue the pursuit of his profession, one physi-
cian is not, while another, his neighbor, who may be his equal or 
superior in learning, experience, and ability, is, required to pay five 
dollars.  This is not the equality of the constitution.  The magnitude 
of the unequal burden is not material.  If any inequality were per-
missible, the discrimination might be made prohibitory, and a mo-
nopoly of the business given to physicians who have resided in a 
town or city for a specified time.
102
 
At least five rules were settled in this era.  First, all taxes had to be on 
polls or estates.  Second, except for the savings bank tax, all taxes on es-
tates by a given unit of government had to be at one rate with uniform val-
uation.  Third, express tax exemptions were permissible to the extent that a 
bounty or subsidy under the protective power would be.  Fourth, regulatory 
penalties and license fees were exercises of the protective power, not taxes, 
but subject to general requirements of uniformity and equality.  Fifth, 
monetary charges for privileges voluntarily accepted were not taxes.  All of 




C. 1903–1940: Constitutional Change, the Struggle to Give it Meaning 
There were no significant constitutional challenges to the state‘s tax 
system in the two decades after State v. Express and Curry v. Spencer, nor 
were there any new attempts to assert a plenary taxing power.  However, 
there was increasing demand for constitutional revision to broaden the tax-
ing power.  The Constitutional Convention of 1902 considered several 
  
The fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, providing that ―no state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . . nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,‖ adds 
nothing to the rights and liberties of the citizens of this state.  It merely confirms to them by feder-
al sanction the rights secured by the action of their ancestors a century ago.  It has wrought no 
change in the law of the state.  An enactment obnoxious to this provision of the national constitu-
tion is in New Hampshire no more ineffective than it would be in its absence. 
Id. at 115, 18 A. at 880 (omission in original). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 117, 18 A. at 880. 
 102. Id. at 117, 18 A. at 881. 
 103. Revenues based on the protective power or privilege theories will be addressed in a forthcoming 
article about non-tax revenues. 
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proposals to permit new forms of taxation.  It rejected a general power to 
impose ―any kind of tax under heaven or known among civilized men . . . 
.‖104  Instead, the Convention proposed narrower revisions.  The voters 
rejected an amendment permitting a tax on income from certain intan-
gibles.
105
  They adopted, however, a seemingly modest addition to the leg-
islature‘s authority to tax property.  The reference in part II, article 6 to 
―polls and estates‖ was supplemented with the phrase ―and other classes of 
property, including franchises and property when passing by will or inhe-
ritance.‖106  For more than three decades the court struggled with the ne-
cessary implications of this seemingly simple phrase. 
The new power was exercised in 1905 with the adoption of a tax on 
legacies and succession,
107
 and promptly challenged in Thompson v. Kid-
der.
108
  Perhaps inspired by Chief Justice Doe‘s theory that the taxing 
clauses of part II of the constitution were subordinate to the equality claus-
es of the New Hampshire Bill of Rights,
109
 the challengers argued the tax 
violated part I, article 12 and the unchanged proportionality requirement of 
part II, article 5: 
It is not claimed that the language of article 6, as it now stands, 
is not sufficient to authorize legislation of this character; but the 
contention is that such action is contrary to the requirements of 
other provisions of the instrument, namely, article 12 of the bill 
of rights,—―Every member of the community has a right to be 
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and proper-
ty.  He is, therefore, bound to contribute his share in the ex-
pense of such protection,‖—and the provision of article 5, part 
  
 104. STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION 597 (1903) (remarks 
of delegate Chandler).  This seems to refer to an early proposal by Chandler to amend article 6 allowing 
taxes on polls and estates ―by taxation in such other method as may be equal, equitable, and just.‖  Id. 
at 250.  That proposal was later postponed indefinitely on Chandler‘s own motion.  Id. at 684.  Strange-
ly, in Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311 (1915), the majority seemed to assert that the 
amendment submitted to the people was the one characterized as permitting ―any kind of tax under 
heaven‖ and to partly rely on that to permit taxing income.  Id. at 77 N.H. at 616, 93 A. at 313.  Both 
the CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION and the final language of the amendment demonstrate 
that this was mistaken.  That the amendment actually adopted was intended more narrowly was soon 
clarified, and that view has since prevailed.  Conner v. State 82 N.H. 126, 130 A. 357 (1925). 
 105. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 627, 93 A. at 318 (Peaslee, J., dissenting). 
 106. The choice of article 6 and neglect of Article 5 was a bit odd: 
Article 6, as it stood before the amendment . . . while assuming that only polls and estates were 
proper subjects of taxation, was intended to secure proportional assessments by requiring frequent 
revaluations.  The main purpose of the amended article is to declare the subjects of taxation.  Log-
ically, in its main purpose article 6 might now perhaps more properly stand as an addition to ar-
ticle 5, devoted to an enumeration of powers granted to the general court. 
Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N.H. 89, 95, 65 A. 392, 395 (1906). 
 107. 1905 N.H. Laws ch. 40. 
 108. 74 N.H. 89, 65 A. 392 (1906). 
 109. See State v. U.S. & Can Express (State v. Express), 60 N.H. 219, 249–50 (1880). 
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second, granting ―full power and authority‖ to the general court 
―to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, 
rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, and residents within, 
the said state, and upon all estates within the same.‖110 
Such an argument could hardly prevail over a constitutional amend-
ment with ―express language admittedly sufficient for the purpose.‖111  As 
with poll taxes, which had never been proportional in the commonly ac-
cepted senses,
112




However, the exception to the general constitutional rule did not ex-
tend beyond logical necessity.  It was not 
necessary to conclude, because by amendment an additional dispropor-
tional tax has been authorized, that it was intended to abrogate the fun-
damental rule of equal rights or the general rules of equality and pro-




The tax, where applicable, was at a uniform rate of 5%, so there was 
no issue of graduation.
115
  All persons were equally privileged to dispose of 
property in either taxable or non-taxable ways, and similarly to inherit.
116
  
The only possible inequality was in the exemption, which the court found 
permissible: ―There are good reasons why the passing of property to near 
relatives, or the gift of it to charitable purposes or directly to the public, 
should not be subject to an exaction by the state.‖117 
  
 110. Thompson, 74 N.H. at 90, 65 A. at 393. 
 111. Id. at 94, 65 A. at 395. 
 112. Id. at 96, 65 A. at 396. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Different rates based on relationship to the deceased were tentatively approved in Opinion of the 
Justices, 76 N.H. 597, 79 A. 490 (1911), an opinion declining to reach the question of graduation based 
on the amount of estate or legacy.  Graduation based on amount was later rejected in an advisory opi-
nion.  Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 120 A. 629 (1923).  Both forms of graduation were ulti-
mately rejected in Williams v. State, 81 N.H. 341, 125 A. 661 (1924). 
 116. Thompson, 74 N.H. at 97, 65 A. at 396. 
 117. Id.  The court did not elaborate on those reasons.  It cited two cases from other states.  The first, 
Minot v. Winthrop, 38 N.E. 512 (Mass. 1894), refers to the lesser ―moral claim of collaterals and stran-
gers.‖  Minot, 38 N.E. at 516.  The other referred to a widow or daughter deprived of ―her natural 
protector.‖  Nunnemacher v. State, 108 N.W. 627, 637 (Wis. 1906).  The exemption seems to be based 
on a protective power theory, but the court also invoked a general power to reasonably ―omi[t] . . . from 
the description of the property required to be taxed.‖  Thompson, 74 N.H. at 97, 65 A. at 396.  The 
difference is that between a permissible subsidy of the acts or parties benefited by the exemption, and 
simply confining the taxable class of property as that passing to collateral relatives and unrelated per-
sons.  See infra Part III.CD. 
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For some time, the legacy and succession tax seems to have been 
thought the only innovation permitted under the 1903 amendment.
118
  The 
new power to tax ―other classes of property‖ did not immediately change 
the rule that all taxes on property (other than legacies and successions and 
deposits in savings banks) had to be at the same rate throughout each tax-
ing district.
119
  The people rejected constitutional amendments permitting 
the ―tax[ation] of credits at a less[er] rate than other property,‖120 and a 
lesser rate for standing timber
121




Without apparently realizing it, the court took the first step toward dif-
ferential tax rates on classes of property in 1915.  The House of Represent-
atives requested an advisory opinion on a proposal to exempt certain secur-
ities from the general property tax and to instead tax the income derived 
from them ―at the uniform rate‖ (taken to mean the same rate as imposed 
on other property).
123
  This was the beginning of the interest and dividends 
tax (IDT).  A four-justice majority advised that the proposal was constitu-
tional.  Removing classes of property from the list of taxable estate was 
incontestable.
124
  They believed using the uniform property tax rate cured 
the disproportionality fatal to a previous interest and dividends tax propos-
al.
125
  Taxing money which might also have been taxed as part of the prop-




The remaining question was whether this apparent income tax was 
constitutionally authorized: 
  
 118. General corporate franchise taxes, when ultimately considered, ran into insuperable obstacles. 
See infra text accompanying notes 15153. 
 119. The possibility of a different rate of taxation on railroad property was raised without decision in 
Wyatt v. State Board of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 553, 70 A. 387, 388 (1908), but the court reasserted 
that all property was to be taxed at the same rate in Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 588, 596, 79 A. 31, 
34–35 (1911)—which proposed differential assessment of stocks and similar investments—and in 
Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 609, 85 A. 757 (1913)—which proposed differential rate for standing 
timber. 
 120. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 616, 93 A. 311, 314 (1915). 
 121. Id. at 625, 93 A. at 318 (Peaslee, J., dissenting). 
 122. Convention to Revise the Constitution, January 20, 1920, in NEW HAMPSHIRE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION, CONVENTION TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION, JUNE 5, 1918, JAN. 13, 1920, JAN. 28, 1921 
376 (1918) [hereinafter CONVENTIONS 1918–21]; Special Session, Convention to Revise the Constitu-
tion Held January 28, 1921 in CONVENTIONS 1918–21 at 393, 432; see also Williams v. State, 81 N.H. 
341, 348, 125 A. 661, 665 (1924), overruled by Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trs. of Darthmouth Coll., 89 
N.H. 471, 200 A. 786 (1938) (overruling the holding that in the absence of testamentary directions, the 
federal estate tax must be charged pro rata against all the beneficiaries rather than solely against the 
residuary legatee). 
 123. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 612–13, 93 A. at 312. 
 124. Id. at 612, 93 A. at 312. 
 125. Id. at 613, 93 A. at 312.  The court again required the same rate for incomes and other property 
in Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 554, 120 A. 629, 630 (1923). 
 126. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 613–15, 93 A. at 312–13. 
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It may be said that the proposed tax is in effect an income tax.  
An income tax is generally understood to be a tax an arbitrary 
rate—an excise tax.  It has even been held not to be a property tax, 
and to be a direct tax under the federal Constitution.  But the fact 
that this tax in certain of its features resembles an income tax does 
not place it beyond the legislative power of classification.
127
 
Although it referred to the anomalous 1866 opinion upholding an income 
tax,
128
 the majority did not ―express an opinion as to the validity of the 
taxation of incomes‖ when approving the proposal as a tax on property 
received by the investor, which would otherwise have been taxable in the 
hands of the issuer.
129
  This was just a rearrangement of the formal inci-
dence of a tax on estates; it was as constitutionally indifferent as whether 
real estate was taxed to the mortgagor or mortgagee.
130
  Possible implica-
tions of the new constitutional authority to tax ―other classes of property‖ 
were not considered or, apparently, even noticed.
131
  Treating income as a 
category of estate, the court said investment income had to be taxed at the 
same rate as other property.
132
 
Justice Peaslee wrote a long and compelling dissent, demonstrating 
that taxing some incomes at the same rate as property could not be in any 
meaningful sense proportional.  The resulting effective rates were radically 
different: 
The practical situation presented by the proposed law is this: The 
owner of a farm worth $ 1,000 pays (at a two per cent rate) a tax of 
$ 20, while the owner of a five per cent note for $ 1,000 pays a tax 
of $ 1.  Upon whatever theory it is founded and by whatever argu-
ment it is justified, the practical, everyday result is that this inequa-
lity exists as between those two neighbors.  Two property taxpay-
ers of equal property, of equal ability to pay, and with equal duty 
to support the state, are taxed unequally by the ratio of 20 to 1.
133
 
Despite Justice Peaslee‘s analysis, the court clung for some years to the 
irrational proposition that gross incomes were a taxable ―estate‖ and while 
taxing them was permissible, the rate applicable to static property was re-
  
 127. Id. at 615, 93 A. at 313 (citations omitted). 
 128. Id. at 617, 93 A. at 314 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 53 N.H. 634 (1866)). 
 129. Id. at 617, 93 A. at 314. 
 130. Id. at 613, 93 A. at 312 (citing Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538 (1879)). 
 131. Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 126, 128–31, 130 A. 357, 358–60 (1925) (Peaslee, C.J.) (Chief Justice 
Peaslee had dissented in 1915). 
 132. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 616, 93 A. at 318. 
 133. Id. at 625, 93 A. at 318 (Peaslee, J., dissenting). 
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quired.
134
  However, in 1925, with Justice Peaslee writing for the court, it 
discovered the rationale for taxing incomes as property, but differently, 
despite manifest disproportionality. 
The occasion was a constitutional challenge to the interest and divi-
dends tax adopted in 1923.
135
  Invoking nineteenth-century decisions for-
bidding taxation of shares in the hands of shareholders of corporations 
already taxed on their property,
136
 the challengers alleged it was a dispro-
portionate double-tax.  The court conceded this, but found the dispropor-
tion necessarily authorized by the 1903 amendment permitting taxation of 
―other classes of property‖: 
In 1903 a fundamental change was made in the people‘s grant 
of the taxing power.  In the generation just preceding that time, the 
idea that the constitutional provision for contribution of ―his share‖ 
by each taxable party meant a share determined by a common and 
unvarying method had been upheld and amplified in great detail 
and with a wealth of argument. 
. . . . 
What was intended by the grant of power to tax ―other classes 
of property‖?  Other provisions of the amendment show, by elimi-
nation, what it does not mean.  It does not refer to any form of tax 
upon estates—that is, to taxes upon ownership, possession or en-
joyment of property.  It had theretofore been decided that the term 
estates covers all these matters.
137
 
As all ownership, possession, or enjoyment of property was already taxable 
under existing powers, the new language must have intended something 
else: 
[T]he provision means that property may be taxed for reasons oth-
er than ownership.  The test of taxability may be put upon other 
grounds.  ―Other classes of property‖ is here used as the equivalent 
for property otherwise classified.  The incidence of the tax is to be 




 134. Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 554, 120 A. 629, 630 (1923). 
 135. Conner, 82 N.H. at 126, 130 A. at 357. 
 136. E.g., Robinson v. Dover, 59 N.H. 521 (1880); Smith v. Burley, 9 N.H. 423 (1838). 
 137. Conner, 82 N.H. at 12728, 130 A. at 358. 
 138. Id. at 128–29, 130 A. at 359. 
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Once it was clear that other classes of property could be taxed on a differ-
ent basis from, and necessarily in addition to, estates, the logic that permit-
ted double taxation of inheritances
139





The power to tax other classes of property, or property classi-
fied in some way other than as estate, was granted.  No form of tax 
coming within this description, which would not impinge upon the 
rules theretofore laid down as to constitutional limitations upon the 
power to tax property, has been suggested.  It is believed that none 
can be found.  The implied exception from earlier provisions is ne-
cessary if this phrase in the amendment is to be given any effect.
142
 
The expressed power to define and tax classes of property based on some-
thing other than ownership, possession, or enjoyment necessarily precluded 
a challenge to any double taxation or other disproportionality inherent in 
the difference between the classes.
143
  Taxable estates were ―static‖ proper-
ty, the new classes were ―dynamic.‖144  The distinction has also been de-
scribed in the modern era as the difference between static property and 
―property in motion.‖145 
This re-conceptualization of the 1903 amendment is the foundation of 
most modern state taxes.  It was not, however, the breakthrough hoped for 
by the advocates of plenary taxing power.  In 1927, during a burst of fiscal 
creativity, the legislature submitted to the court two proposals: a compre-
hensive scheme of occupational taxes with ―118 separate classes, each with 
one or more schedules of stated charges,‖ and an income tax.146 
The court, apparently shocked, declared that the occupational taxes 
―appear[ed] to have been drawn without any reference to the structure of 
our state government‖ and ―unquestionably exceed[ed] the legislative 
power.‖147  The legislature characterized these as ―privilege‖ taxes, but the 
court noted that 
[m]any of the occupations or acts thus sought to be levied upon in-
volve only the ordinary transactions of private life.  They contain no 
  
 139. While the constitutional language is ―property passing by will or inheritance‖ and the related 
legislation usually refers to legacies and succession, I will sometimes follow the frequent practice of 
the court by referring to these as inheritance taxes. 
 140. 74 N.H. 89, 65 A. 392 (1906). 
 141. Conner, 82 N.H. at 129, 131, 130 A. at 360. 
 142. Id. at 129, 130 A. at 359. 
 143. Id. at 130, 130 A. at 359. 
 144. This distinction was first made by Justice Peaslee in his dissent in Opinion of the Justices, 77 
N.H. 611, 621, 93 A. 311, 316 (1915) (Peaslee, J., dissenting), and adopted in the same terms by the 
court in Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 576, 149 A. 321, 330 (1930). 
 145. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537, 539, 64 A.2d 320, 321 (1949). 
 146. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 563, 566, 138 A. 284, 286–87 (1927). 
 147. Id. at 563, 138 A. at 286. 
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element subject to supervision either under the police power or as 
things affected with a public use.
148
 
This would not have been permitted even under the rejected excise clause 
of the Massachusetts Constitution.
149
 
The same proposals were addressed as taxes on ―franchises,‖ a form of 
tax expressly permitted by the 1903 amendment.  Such a franchise was a 
―right to do certain things, giving a power to enter upon transactions which 
is not possessed by the people as of common right . . . .‖150  Not only did 
many of the occupations taxed lack this quality, they were also subject to 
different rates, and franchise taxes were subject to the same rules of pro-
portionality among all holding the franchise.
151
 
In reply to a general question about taxing corporations differently 
from those engaged in similar businesses, the court laid down what became 
a fundamental principle of New Hampshire tax law: 
If the privilege is taxed when held by a corporation, it must be 
when exercised by collective owners associated together under 
some other form of agreement, or by an individual.  Singling out 
corporations, and taxing them upon privileges, while permitting 
other holders of like privileges to go tax free, is a discrimination 
not permitted by the constitution.
152
 
Of course, a corporate charter of perpetual succession and limited lia-
bility is itself a franchise, but if 
the bare franchise to be a corporation is to be considered as prop-
erty, and therefore taxable, it could be taxed only upon an ad va-
lorem basis.  The valuation would necessarily be confined to an 
appraisal of the worth of the power to be a corporation, as distin-
guished from the power to do certain business.
153
 
The court volunteered an alternative.  A franchise, being both a proper-
ty right and a privilege voluntarily assumed, could be either taxed as prop-
  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. (citing O‘Keeffe v. City of Somerville, 76 N.E. 457 (Mass. 1906)).  That clause has been 
subject to widely varying construction.  The history is recounted in Opinions of the Justices to the 
Governor, 556 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1990), in which a bare majority finally concluded that the word 
―commodities‖ was sufficiently comprehensive to permit a tax on the sale of services. 
 150. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 564, 138 A. at 286. 
 151. Id. at 565, 138 A. at 287. 
 152. Id.; accord Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 206, 278 A.2d 348 (1971); Opinion of the Justices, 
84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (1930).  The concept has been applied evenhandedly—it would be fatal to a 
proposed tax on business incomes to exclude income of corporations.  Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 
at 573, 149 A. at 328. 
 153. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 565, 138 A. at 287. 
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erty or, without need of proportionality, be granted on condition of a pay-
ment.  ―[T]he power to impose conditions upon grants is not to be treated 
as a power to tax, as taxation is understood in this jurisdiction.‖154  It had 
long been held that a payment could be exacted as a condition on granting 
a true privilege.
155
  The court did not choose to identify anything other than 
corporate capacity that could be treated as a privilege.  Concluding that, as 
a whole, the specific legislation before them was irretrievably unconstitu-
tional, the court declined ―to examine the long list of occupations, etc., 
which the bill declare[ed] to be privileges, or to attempt to ascertain the 
validity of such a classification.‖156 
The income tax would have been constitutional, despite being levied at 
a rate different from that on ―estates‖ (i.e. the general property tax), but for 
the fact that different rates were hypothesized for different types of in-
come.
157
  The previous opinion that all taxes on ―other classes of property‖ 
had to be at common rate
158
 was ―no longer tenable.‖159  This however, was 
done in a way that introduced the idea that classification of property, by 
distinctive events, created classes of taxes: 
The rule is firmly established that all taxes of a given class 
must be laid at a common rate.  This rule applies to annual taxes 
upon estates, and to inheritance taxes.  The reasoning in the case 
last cited leads to the conclusion that the principles there enun-




In 1930, and again in 1937, the court confirmed that taxes on receipts from 
sales were a fourth class of tax that could not be correlated with those on 
estates, inheritances, and incomes, justifying a different rate.
161
  They 
might be thought a fifth class, but franchises as such are static property, to 




 154. Id. at 565, 138 A. at 287.  Monetary exactions in return for grants of privileges are dealt with 
infra Part IV.F. 
 155. Rockingham Ten Cent Sav. Bank v. Portsmouth, 52 N.H. 17 (1872); Nashua Sav. Bank v. City 
of Nashua, 46 N.H. 389, 399 (1866); accord Wyatt v. State Bd. of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552 , 70 A. 
387 (1908). 
 156. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 566, 138 A. at 287. 
 157. Id. at 570, 138 A. at 289. 
 158. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311 (1915). 
 159. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 570, 138 A. at 289. 
 160. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The court also stated that ―all income taxes must be 
laid at a common rate.‖  Opinion of the Justices 84 N.H. 557, 571, 149 A. 321, 327 (1930). 
 161. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 190 A. 801 (1937); Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 
149 A. 321 (1930). 
 162. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 576, 149 A. at 330. 
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Throughout this era, differences in rate or valuation between taxes on 
classes of property were justifiable only when the type of tax could not be 
―correlated and made uniform with the average of the general property tax . 
. . and disproportion [was] inevitable.‖163  So firm was the notion that uni-
form rates were required within broad classes of taxes, that a proposed tax 
on the annual increment of growing timber was ―in the nature of an income 
tax,‖ and had to be ―coordinated with other income taxes.‖164  However, 
the broad classes were not exhaustive.  On the same day it issued the tim-
ber increment opinion, the court advised that a timber severance tax would 
be in a class by itself, and it ―could not be correlated with other taxes, and 
therefore the rate could be fixed without direct relation to that imposed by 
other taxing statutes.‖165 
There were several opinions during this era attempting to clarify and 
apply standards for exemptions.
166
  The use of conditional grants of privi-
leges as an alternative to taxation was expressly affirmed.
167
  However, the 
great and lasting work of this period was the court‘s determination that the 
―other classes of property‖ made taxable in 1903 necessarily included 
property determined by ―some element other than ownership, possession or 
enjoyment,‖168 that the power to define and tax such property necessarily 
permitted some forms of  double taxation, and that, when differing classes 
of property could not be rationally correlated, uniformity of rate and as-
sessment were not meaningful and therefore not required. 
D. 1940–Present: Proliferation of Categories 
1. Latent Issues About the Power to Classify 
At least as early as 1930, the court recognized that taxes on ―distinctive 
class[es] of property . . . imposed upon a certain event‖ shared some of the 
  
 163. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. at 505, 190 A. at 805. 
 164. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 578, 149 A. at 334. 
 165. Id. at 575, 149 A. at 329. 
 166. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (proposed exemptions from 
income tax excessive); Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511 (1929) (aid to a 
new textile mill not a public purpose).  ―[I]ndustrial welfare and general prosperity is not a valid reason 
for the aid.‖  Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 488, 190 A. 425, 428 (1937).  The court has since 
recanted this position.  Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 95, 100, 697 A.2d 120, 123 (1997) (citations 
omitted). 
 167. See generally New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 89 N.H. 21, 192 A. 297 (1937) (business by 
foreign insurance companies); Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927) (charge for 
corporate capacity); Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 554, 120 A. 629, 287 (1923) (gasoline ―tax‖ 
as toll for privilege of motor vehicle use of highways). 
 168. Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 126, 128, 130 A. 357, 359 (1925). 
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characteristics of an excise.
169
  However, they remain property taxes and 
must be laid ad valorem.
170
  ―[T]he taxing power is fixed by the language 
of the amendment and not by a classification of taxes by authorities upon 
economics.‖171 
Classes of ―property in motion‖ could be defined and taxed.  Some of 
those classes were so incommensurable with others that meaningful pro-
portionality was impossible and differing rates were justified.  However, 
the nature and limits of the classification process had not been explored.  
When a tax was levied on something other than the ―ownership, posses-
sion, or enjoyment‖ of property, what connection, if any, was there be-
tween the kind of property in the class and the ―other grounds‖172 for levy-
ing the tax, the ―characteristic event‖173 that justified classification?  Tim-
ber, when severed, was an approved classification.
174
  Yet that was based 
on ―a characteristic event, not common to other property.‖175  What of an 
event that was common to multiple types of property?  Before 1940, the 
court appeared to believe that the event was the controlling factor, at least 
to the extent rates or valuations differed between classes.  The 1903 
amendment gave authority to 
lay various kinds of ad valorem taxes upon property, incident upon 
some characteristic event, which may fairly be considered to rea-
sonably delimit a class of property, so that the selection cannot be 
rejected as arbitrary, if the event itself affords some rational basis 
for the imposition of a tax.
176
 
Thus one could tax sales, incomes, and inheritances; but must each 
kind of taxed property, sharing the defining event, be taxed at the same 
rate?  Exemptions could differ within sub-classes,
177
 producing different 
effective rates.  The principal opinion authorizing exemptions varying by 




―The rule [was] firmly established that all taxes of a given class must 
be laid at a common rate.‖179  But classes were anything but ―given.‖  If, 
  
 169. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 575–76, 149 A. at 329–30 (approving a timber severance 
tax). 
 170. Id. at 576, 149 A. at 330. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Conner, 82 N.H. at 128, 130 A. at 359. 
 173. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 575, 149 A. at 329. 
 174. Id. at 575, 149 A. at 330. 
 175. Id. at 575, 149 A. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 576, 149 A. at 330. 
 177. Id. at 571, 149 A. at 328; Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 573, 138 A. 284, 290–91 (1927). 
 178. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 57071, 138 A. 284, 289 (1927). 
 179. Id. 
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for example, sale of goods at retail defined the class, was failure to include 
all such sales an exemption?  Among those sales taxed, could there be dif-
fering rates for separate classes or subclasses?  If so, on what basis?  The 
court had approved taxing one sort of income defined by its source.  What 
were acceptable classes of income?  Were some so incommensurable that 
the rates could differ?  Ultimately, what was a distinct class of property in 
the constitutional sense? 
I will deal with the modern era first by analyzing the decision that in-
augurated it, then by tracing the court‘s treatment of sales, income, fran-
chise, and estate taxes, as well as some issues that cross all categories.  
These categories, however commonly used, are also highly artificial in 
New Hampshire.  As our taxes are on property, not persons, formal inci-
dence in terms of the payor is largely irrelevant.
180
  Who pays and how are 
matters of convenience, efficiency, and the politics of appearances.  La-
bels, as opposed to actual operation, can skew arguments and confuse 
analysis, but, in principle, are meaningless under the state constitution.  
However, their political significance has sometimes led to judicial efforts 
for truth in labeling.
181
  When the focus is on the property moving or being 
transformed, for example, there is no constitutionally meaningful distinc-
tion between a sales tax on the consumer and a gross receipts tax on the 
seller.  A franchise can be taxed as a personal estate or as the source of 
income.  At least when it involves a regulated utility, a tax on even net 
income recovered in the rates can be indistinguishable from a sales tax on 
the utility‘s consumers.  Classification and exemption issues cross all these 
lines.  The categories nevertheless are a necessary part of the common vo-
cabulary, and they have sometimes shaped the arguments and decisions. 
2. The Tobacco Tax, Narrower Classification Permitted 
In 1940, Havens v. Attorney General
182
 opened the modern era by con-
fronting some of these questions.  The plaintiff, a tobacconist, challenged 
on several constitutional grounds a new 15% tax on retail sales of tobac-
co.
183
  The court split three to two, with the majority holding that the law 
was ―a sales tax and not an occupation tax.‖184  At the time, a tobacco tax 
  
 180. Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538 (1879) (mortgagor or mortgagee).  Sometimes the payor is 
significant for federal constitutional reasons.  See, e.g., Ne. Airlines, Inc. v. N.H. Aeronautics Comm‘n, 
111 N.H. 5, 273 A.2d 676 (1971) (passenger emplaning fee levied on carrier, not passenger). 
 181. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 349, 357, 461 A.2d 132, 137 (1983) (dissent insisting 
that a franchise tax on gross receipts was a sales tax ―to be borne by the consumers‖). 
 182. 91 N.H. 115, 14 A.2d 636 (1940). 
 183. Id. at 116–17, 14 A.2d at 637 (examining agricultural exemption, valuation methods, mechanics 
of collection, and differential rates between distributors and retailers). 
 184. Id. 
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Chief Justice Allen dissented, calling the decision ―a revolutionary de-
parture from the views expounded and developed in this State.‖186  The 
court‘s prior opinions approving a sales tax were no warrant for a tax on 
the sale of a single commodity.  The event defining the class was a sale.  If 
there were to be a tax on some sales but not others, that involved an ex-
emption—an exemption of the kind that required a public purpose suffi-
cient to justify disproportionality.
187
  ―If out of ten subjects or forms of 
property only one is taxed, the others are exempted.‖188  While Chief Jus-
tice Allen could conceive of a separate class of luxuries, he could not dis-
cern a public interest: 
[I]t is not perceived how it can be found to be for the public wel-
fare, in taxing the sale of tobacco products, to exempt the sale of 
such articles, for example, as smoking accessories, chewing gum, 




The Chief Justice argued that the various bases on which the majority per-
mitted separate classification of tobacco sales could be used to selectively 
tax nearly any other business selling a particular commodity,
190
 or further 
sub-classify tobacco based on use in cigars, cigarettes, or pipes.
191
 
Although dissenting separately, with additional alternative grounds, 
Justice Page agreed that the Chief Justice had articulated ―the judicial 
theory of classification consistently held in New Hampshire for over a 
hundred years.‖192  ―[A] retail sales tax must operate alike on all retail sales 
which cannot be distinguished upon reasonable and just grounds.‖193  Of 
  
 185. Id. at 118, 14 A.2d at 638.  While restriction of sales to minors was mentioned, all the published 
opinions said or assumed the sole purpose of the tax was revenue.  Chief Justice Allen‘s dissent did 
discuss possible health issues, but only hypothetically, and in a way he found these insufficient to 
justify singling out one potentially unhealthy commodity.  Id. at 124–26, 14 A.2d 642–43. 
 186. Id. at 121, 14 A.2d at 640 (Allen, C.J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 121–22, 14 A.2d at 640. 
 188. Id. at 123, 14 A.2d at 641. 
 189. Id. at 124, 14 A.2d at 641. 
 190. Id. at 121–31, 14 A.2d at 640–46. 
 191. Id. at 130–31, 14 A.2d at 645.  The chief justice was prophetic.  In 1951 the court was skeptical 
of an exemption for cigars, but said a tobacco tax could be levied on cigarettes alone as class, tacitly 
exempting all other forms of tobacco.  Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 544, 81 A.2d 851, 852 
(1951).  In 1955 the court advised that to tax cigarettes at 20% and other tobacco products at 15% with 
no apparent justification for the difference would be unconstitutional.  Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 
517, 517–18, 113 A.2d 119, 120 (1955). 
 192. Havens, 91 N.H. at 131, 14 A.2d at 646 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 133, 14 A.2d at 646. 
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course, as will appear below, the majority concluded there were reasonable 
and just grounds. 
The majority declined to survey the slippery slopes posited by Chief 
Justice Allen.  It considered the issue to be selection, not exemption: 
―[T]he essential inquiry would appear to be whether the selection of tobac-
co as the subject of the tax is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate the 
legal requirements of classification.‖194  Although not directly citing them, 
the court appeared to be invoking opinions reaching back to 1829 recog-
nizing very broad discretion in the legislature to select objects of taxa-
tion.
195




The Canaan decision, along with those cited in support of legislative 
discretion in the selection of subjects of taxation, involved only the tax on 
estates—the general property tax; the only selectivity involved was wheth-
er to include particular kinds of property in the one class then permitted, 
with the entire class taxed at one uniform rate and valuation.  Selection was 
in part necessary—it would be impractical if not impossible to tax all con-
ceivable kinds of property.  It also presented little threat of narrowly selec-
tive, discriminatory taxation.  None of the taxes struck down in the nine-
teenth century involved including particular categories of property in the 
general tax on estates, or excluding them.  Each was a special levy with 
differing rates, valuations, or exemptions.  Until 1903 there was no power 
to create ―other classes of property‖ specially defined and taxed at differing 
rates and valuations.
197
  The implications of selection in the latter case for 
proportionality, equality, and just shares are manifestly different than when 
there was one class and one rate.  As later recognized by the court, it was 
this new power that entailed the ―danger of creating, by narrow classifica-
tion, a tax upon occupations or privileges.‖198 
The nineteenth-century opinions of the court gave support for both the 
majority view and the dissent.  The court had treated the legislature‘s deci-
sion to put a particular class of property on the taxable list (selection) as 
being almost unreviewable: 
  
 194. Id. at 117, 14 A.2d at 638 (majority opinion). 
 195. See, e.g., Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565 (1829).  ―The reasons which may justify the use of 
the selective power as to the subjects for taxation may be as various as the motives which induce any 
rational action.‖  Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 574, 138 A. 284, 291 (1927).  A key phrase 
from the 1829 opinion regarding the legislature‘s ―wide latitude of discretion‖ was used without cita-
tion.  Havens, 91 N.H. at 118, 14 A.2d at 638. 
 196. 74 N.H. 517, 70 A. 250 (1908); see Havens, 91 N.H. at 117, 14 A.2d at 638. 
 197. See supra note 106 & accompanying text. 
 198. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 546, 548, 81 A.2d 853, 855 (1951); see also Opinion of the 
Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 135, 276 A.2d 817, 820 (1971) (per curiam). 
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Whether the public expense is more justly and wisely divided 
by an inevitably unsuccessful effort to tax all property, or by the 
taxation of some class or classes of property that can be easily, 
equally, and certainly taxed, and the tax of which is equitably col-
lected for the public from all classes of people by the higher gov-
ernment, is not a judicial question.  If there is a class of property, 
the tax of which, by force of the natural law of tax distribution and 
equalization, would be eventually paid in just proportion by the 
whole community, the common burden may be wholly put upon 
that class.  The non-assessment of other classes of property would 
not be an exemption of any class of people.
199
 
The court of that era referred to exemption as occurring either by failure to 
list property as taxable or by express exceptions for property that was oth-
erwise on the taxable list.
200
 
Some ambiguity seems to have arisen from the fact that both inclusion 
(selection) and exclusion (tacit or express exemption) were used to define 
taxable ―estates.‖  Under the statutory scheme all real estate was taxed un-
less expressly exempted,
201
 but personal property was taxed only if 
listed.
202
  There was also a practical problem with judicial review of any 
failure to list a type of personal property.  The court could not order a tax 
unauthorized by the legislature and would have had to void the entire per-
sonal property tax to give a remedy for underinclusion.
203
  However, ex-
  
 199. Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 555–56 (1879) (emphasis added); see also Brewster v. 
Hough, 10 N.H. 138 (1839); Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. at 565.  But see Boston, Concord & Montreal  
R.R. v. State, 60 N.H. 87 (1880) (conceding differences of opinion on judicial and legislative roles in 
achieving constitutionally required equality). 
 200. ―[T]he legislature may provide, by general laws, for the exemption of certain classes of property 
from taxation, as well as exempt it, in fact, by omitting it in the description of property required to be 
taxed.‖  Brewster, 10 N.H. at 142.  Brewster or decisions echoing it have been cited repeatedly, as 
recently as Smith v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 692 A.2d 486 (1997), and Estate of 
Robitaille v. N.H. Dep’t of Revenue Admin., 149 N.H. 595, 827 A.2d 981 (2003).  These later decisions 
applied the broad language of legislative discretion to classes of dynamic property without noting the 
shift in context. 
 201. As is still the case: ―All real estate, whether improved or unimproved, shall be taxed except as 
otherwise provided.‖  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:6 (2009). 
 202. ―[T]he policy of our law has been to tax all real estate and the enumerated personal property.‖  
Nashua Sav. Bank v. City of Nashua, 46 N.H. 389, 408 (1886).  Thus, the list for personal property 
included ―carriages if exceeding fifty dollars in value‖ as a class, not carriages of fifty dollars value or 
less as an exemption from a class of personal property or carriages.  Id. at 396.  At this level there is no 
practical significance in the choice of verbal formula.  In 1927 the court recognized this and declared 
that in either case, the issue was one of exemption, which had to be based on the protective power.  
Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570–71, 138 A. 284, 289 (1927). 
 203. To do so would violate part I, article 28 of the New Hampshire Constitution.  The problem is 
best explained in Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511 (1929): ―[I]n matters of taxation 
the constitution is not self-executing, . . . legislative authority . . . is required.‖  84 N.H. at 4, 146 A. at 
513; see also Town of Canaan v. Enfield Vill. Fire Dist., 74 N.H. 517, 70 A. 250 (1908). 
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press exemptions were often thought of as somehow different.
204
  They 
could be nullified if unconstitutional.  They involved differential treatment 
of persons or of property that the legislature had already determined was a 
suitable subject of taxation—a direct shifting of the burden among taxpay-
ers prima facie situated similarly.  ―Every exemption is an indirect tax 
upon other property, and can only be justified where a direct tax upon other 
property in its behalf would be within the power of the legislature.‖205 
The payment of a bounty or subsidy out of the public treasury, 
by the protective power, may be made in the form and under the 
name of a tax exemption. . . .  The generation by whom the consti-
tution was adopted understood the state could pay a sum of money 
to an individual, for a public purpose, by exempting him from the 
payment of the same amount of tax.
206
 
As expressed in Chief Justice Allen‘s dissent in Havens, ―to aid some . . . 
without aiding others can be justified only by a line of distinction based on 
a public benefit for those aided not applicable to those not aided.‖207 
None of this, even had it been less ambivalent, was of much use to ei-
ther side in Havens.  Whatever approach one took when there was only one 
class of taxable ―estate,‖ the problem now was how to define additional, 
differing classes.  Was the court facing a highly selective, discriminatory 
occupational tax, or a simple sales tax on tobacco?  And if the latter, could 
it, or should it be distinguished, as the court would come to be asked, from 










The majority said the view that ―an act of the legislature imposing a 
tax should be considered primarily as an exemption statute is believed to 
  
 204. State v. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. 219 (1880) (Doe, C.J.) (discussing the subsidy 
theory); Franklin St. Soc‘y v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342 (1880) (stating a partial exemption for religious 
property was justified because a direct appropriation would have been permissible).  This view was 
affirmed in Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 571 (1927), and, although the proper degree of defe-
rence to legislative judgment was left obscure, the bases for proposed exemptions were thoroughly 
scrutinized. 
 205. Franklin St. Soc’y, 60 N.H. at 345–46. 
 206. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. at 259–60 (Doe, C.J.). 
 207. Havens v. Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 127, 14 A.2d 636, 643 (1940) (Allen, C.J., dissenting). 
 208. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 52 A.2d 294 (1947) (holding proposed tax at same rate as 
tobacco tax constitutional). 
 209. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 555, 65 A.2d 876 (1949) (holding apple excise unconstitutional 
occupation tax). 
 210. Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.H. 527, 96 A.2d 733 (1953) (holding milk excise unconstitutional 
occupation tax). 
 211. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 276 A.2d 817 (1971) (per curiam) (determining array of 
service taxes at different rates probably unconstitutional). 
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be wholly without foundation.‖212  Unless the word ―primarily‖ was em-
ployed to convey an unexplained qualification, the court was mistaken.  In 
1927 the court had been presented with two possible income taxes, one that 
taxed only incomes above $2,000 and one that taxed incomes categorically 
but exempted amounts below $2,000.
213
  Some question was raised about 
the difference, but the court dismissed it: ―The terminology used does not 
control.  The substance of the provision must be considered.  The question 
is one of power to grant exemption.‖214  Even Chief Justice Doe, who long 
before the 1902 amendment believed the taxing power was not limited to 
polls and estates, rejected the railway express tax precisely because it was 
too narrow: 
Whether it is a tax imposed upon person, property, income, business, 
gross receipts, profits, or earnings, is immaterial.  It is a tax which one 
class of men are required to pay, and from which all others are exempt.  
It is a perfect example of unequal division of public expense.
215
 
For the proposition that imposition of a tax could not be treated as an 
exemption, the majority quoted only a different proposition from the prob-
lematic opinion in Canaan:
216
 ―No case is to be found holding a tax invalid 
because of the exemption of other property by either express provision or 
failure to enumerate it as taxable.‖217  While literally true in the original 
context, that passage in Canaan did not mean that unjustified exemption 
could not invalidate a tax.  One ground for the unconstitutionality of the 
inheritance tax in Curry v. Spencer had been that the state ―cannot lawfully 
make discriminations and cast the burden upon one class of beneficiaries, 
and exempt all other classes from its operation.‖218  Between Canaan and 
Havens the court had twice declared that a general $2,000 exemption from 
an income tax would be fatally excessive: ―The duty to contribute to the 
maintenance of government is a primary one, the performance of which is 
  
 212. Havens, 91 N.H. at 117, 14 A.2d at 638 (majority opinion). 
 213. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570, 138 A. 284, 289 (1927). 
 214. Id. 
 215. State v. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 263 (1880) (emphasis added).  Of course, 
Chief Justice Doe would have been willing, with evidence of the proper motive, to uphold a tobacco 
―tax‖ as a protective power penalty, but that was not the theory in Havens. 
 216. 74 N.H. 517, 70 A. 250 (1908).  Canaan was a case of statutory interpretation involving exemp-
tion of property owned by public bodies outside their own boundaries.  The principal opinion is a far-
ranging discourse filled with broad propositions on many topics, much of it dicta.  As Chief Justice 
Allen observed, only two justices of the three who sat joined in the opinion and perhaps only one on the 
point cited.  Havens, 91 N.H. at 124, 14 A.2d at 641 (Allen, C.J., dissenting).  Canaan‘s precedential 
value was expressly discounted by a unanimous court in Town of Keene v. Town of Roxbury, 81 N.H. 
332, 126 A. 7 (1924).  Despite this, it has been cited for one proposition or another by the court at least 
forty-three times, and at the time of this writing has no cautionary signal in LexisNexis‘s Shepard‘s. 
 217. Canaan, 74 N.H. at 540, 70 A. at 259; see also Havens, 91 N.H. at 117, 14 A.2d at 638. 
 218. 61 N.H. 624, 632 (1882). 
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not to be excused for light reasons.‖219  It had also said that leaving corpo-




The majority invoked two specific post-1903 classification decisions 
involving sub-classification of franchises and incomes.  When taxation of 
electric and gas utility franchises was challenged for failure to include oth-
er utility franchises, the court had said: 
The power of the legislature to classify property as taxable or non-
taxable is a broad one, and the validity of its exercise has rarely 
been called in question.  Classification of property by kind has al-
ways been recognized as proper.  So, too, classification by use is 
said to be permissible.  So long as there is a reasonable line of de-
marcation, and there is no attempt to make taxability depend upon 




However, Havens appears to have overlooked the fact that the franchise 
issue was one of inclusion in, or exclusion from, a statewide tax on estates, 
not the creation of a new ―other‖ class of property to be taxed at a different 
rate.
222
  The power to select particular types of property for inclusion in a 
general estate tax had long been settled.  The power to tax ―[o]ther classes 
of property‖ was not based on classification by kind, but ―by some fact 
other than mere ownership.‖223  A non-estate tax could be levied on a ―dis-
tinctive class of property‖ depending upon ―a certain event . . . a characte-
ristic event, not common to other property.‖224  The Havens majority 
quoted this and declared that with ―slight changes in phraseology,‖ it could 
be applied to sustain the tobacco sales tax.
225
  Tobacco was a distinctive 
class of property.  The characteristic event was a sale.  The majority ig-





 219. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571, 149 A. 321, 328 (1930); see also Opinion of the 
Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 507, 190 A. 801, 806 (1937) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 771, 139 
A. at 328). 
 220. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 573, 149 A. at 328. 
 221. Havens, 91 N.H. at 118, 14 A.2d at 638 (citations omitted). 
 222. Id. passim; see also 1 COOLEY ON TAXATION § 280 (4th ed. 1924) (1881).  General propositions 
from a national treatise could not have been applied to New Hampshire when the question involved a 
possible occupation or excise tax.  New Hampshire was already well recognized as peculiar in its 
prohibition of such taxes.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Botkin v. Welsh, 251 N.W. 189, 200 (S.D. 1933) 
(examining the concept of taxable privilege). 
 223. Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 127, 128–29, 130 A. 357, 359 (1925). 
 224. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 575, 149 A. at 329 (approving timber severance tax). 
 225. Havens, 91 N.H. at 119, 12 A.2d at 638. 
 226. Id. 
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The only clear precedent for an arguably under-inclusive tax on a new 
class of property was the court‘s treatment of taxes on income.  Money at 
interest was, of course, property, and the legislature had very broad author-
ity to sub-classify it and subject any or no part of the classes to the general 
tax on estates at the common rate.
227
  In 1915 the court approved a propos-
al to remove from the taxable list various interest or dividend-bearing 
items and levy instead a tax at the common rate on the income they pro-
duced.
228
  The bill explicitly defined such incomes as ―personal estate,‖ 
and the court upheld it as such, with the understanding that it would be 
taxed at the same rate as other property.
229
  Legislative power to make such 
exclusions from and additions to the list of taxable estates could not ―be 
regarded as open to investigation.‖230  The court went further in response to 
the objection that they had approved an income tax.  The proposal re-
mained a tax on ―personal estate.‖231  As such, ―[t]he failure to tax all in-
comes would not be a constitutional objection.  The taxation of a class only 
would present the situation of our present tax laws, which do not tax all 
classes of property.‖232  Despite the fact that it resulted in different effec-
tive tax rates on differently invested ―estates,‖233 the same plan was ap-
proved in 1923.
234
  However, one dissenting justice foresaw hazards in 
applying the old concepts of classification and selection to new classes of 
property: 
[D]isproportion in taxation within the meaning of the constitution 
can be accomplished as effectually by taxing a part of a given class 
of taxable or non-taxable property and giving it a fictitious name, 
as by varying the rules governing the ascertainment of value, or by 
varying the rate.  There is no limit to the diverse classifications 
which might be made once we embark on this method.  To adopt 
such a method would be . . . an elimination of the word ―propor-
tional‖ from the constitution . . . .235 
In Conner v. State, the court upheld the 1923 IDT, using it as the ve-
hicle for announcing its conclusion that the 1903 amendment authorizing 
  
 227. Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 609, 612, 85 A. 757, 758 (1913); Opinion of the Justices, 76 
N.H. 588, 597, 79 A. 31, 35 (1911). 
 228. Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. 611, 93 A. 311 (1915). 
 229. Id. at 612–13, 93 A. at 312. 
 230. Id. at 612, 93 A. at 312. 
 231. Id. at 615, 93 A. at 313. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 552, 560, 120 A. 629, 633 (1923) (Snow, J., dissenting); 
Opinion of the Justices, 77 N.H. at 619, 93 A. at 315 (Peaslee, J., dissenting). 
 234. Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. at 553–54, 120 A. at 630 (majority opinion). 
 235. Id. at 562–63, 120 A. at 634 (Snow, J., dissenting). 
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taxation of ―other classes of property‖ permitted what had previously been 
considered double taxation.
236
  The Havens majority conceded that no issue 
involving the breadth of the class was raised.
237
  The Conner opinion rec-
ognized that other questions about the new theory were likely to arise and 
declined to explore them.
238
  However, the court had approved treating 
income as a new class of property and upheld a tax applicable to only cer-
tain types of income.  It has repeatedly done so since, approving differen-




However, Havens involved only one type of tax at one rate on the 
movement of one kind of property.
240
  Taxonomical complexities would 
arise after the attempt to settle whether a class was defined by the ―charac-
teristic event‖ or a combination of the event with other factors.  In Havens 
the court tacitly repudiated the position it had taken in 1930 and decided 
that, at least in some cases, factors other than the characteristic event could 




Although unwilling to treat the allegedly narrow classification as a 
type of exemption, the majority also declined to treat the definition of 
―other classes of property‖ as unreviewable in the way it had been for per-
sonal estates.  The majority offered some criteria for determining ―the legal 
requirements of classification.‖242  In addition to the characteristic event-
triggering incidence of the tax, the levy was on a commodity distinguished 
by a restriction on sales or gifts to minors, one ―so distinctively in a class 
of its own that it is generally considered by economists as an appropriate 
  
 236. 82 N.H. 126, 130 A. 357 (1925). 
 237. Havens v. Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 117, 14 A.2d 636, 638 (1940). 
 238. Conner, 82 N.H. at 133, 130 A. at 361. 
 239. Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 584 A.2d 1342 (1990) (net business profits plus compen-
sation; scheme unconstitutional on other grounds); Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 349, 461 A.2d 
132 (1983) (gross receipts of franchised utilities); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 512, 374 A.2d 964 
(1977) (capital gains); Austin v. State Tax Comm‘n, 114 N.H. 137, 316 A.2d 165 (1974) (N.H. wages 
of non-residents), rev’d on other grounds, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Opinion of 
the Justices, 110 N.H. 117, 262 A.2d 290 (1970) (net business profits); Opinion of the Justices, 101 
N.H. 549, 137 A.2d 726 (1958) (income from exercise of utility franchises); Opinion of the Justices, 97 
N.H. 543, 81 A.2d 853 (1951) (income from sale of stock in trade by merchants and manufacturers); 
Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537, 65 A.2d 876 (1949) (gross incomes a proper class, specific pro-
posal invalid for lack of uniform rate); Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 190 A. 801 (1937) (earned 
incomes and rents); Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (1930) (earned incomes and 
income from intangibles); Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927) (net incomes from 
manufacturing and mercantile business). 
 240. Havens, 91 N.H. at 119, 14 A.2d at 639 (involving one express exemption for agricultural uses 
that would meet any of the extant tests for exemption). 
 241. Id. at 118–19, 14 A.2d at 638–39 (examining Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 576, 149 A. at 
330 (1930)). 
 242. Havens, 91 N.H. at 117, 14 A.2d at 638. 
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subject of taxation.‖243  Its sale was distinct from ―the ordinary transactions 
of private life which contain no element subject to supervision either under 




As bulwarks against discriminatory taxation, these distinctions were 
hardly formidable.  Chief Justice Allen‘s dissent observed that a justifica-
tion for regulatory exercise of the police power bore no logical connection 
to an exercise of the taxing power, and that such a basis for classification 
would leave ―any selection . . . just and reasonable and the legislative will . 
. . uncontrolled.‖246  ―[A] law taxing only bread . . . would not be validated 
by including in the law requirements for the weight and quality of the 
bread.‖247  He could have pointed to special regulation of many other 
commodities, including milk,
248
 and many common activities, including 
hunting and fishing.
249
  Other commodities were dangerous and subject to 
sales restrictions.
250
  The opinions of economists were a poor guide for the 




Although the Chief Justice was merely dismissive, the criterion of eco-
nomic theory was manifestly unsound.  Economic writing about state taxa-
tion presupposes the nearly universal power to levy excises, grounded in a 
power to declare any occupation ―a privilege and tax it as such.‖252  It takes 
for granted the very authority New Hampshire‘s founders withheld.  As 
observed in one of the opinions cited by the Havens majority itself, ―the 
taxing power is fixed by the language of the amendment and not by a clas-
sification of taxes by authorities on economics.‖253 
  
 243. Id. at 118, 14 A.2d at 638. 
 244. Id.  Had medical science been sufficiently advanced, the court could have followed Chief Justice 
Doe‘s robust view of protective power penalties rather than make vague references to supervision.  See 
State v. U.S. & Canada Express Co., 60 N.H. 219, 257 (1880). 
 245. Havens, 91 N.H. at 119, 14 A.2d at 639. 
 246. Id. at 124, 14 A.2d at 642 (Allen, C.J., dissenting). 
 247. Id. at 126, 14 A.2d at 643; see also State v. Normand, 76 N.H. 541, 85 A. 899 (1913) (upholding 
state board of health‘s bread-wrapping requirement). 
 248. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190 A. 713 (1937) (quality and price regulation). 
 249. Musgrove v. Parker, 84 N.H. 550, 153 A. 320 (1931) (regulations restricting taking of fish and 
game). 
 250. Havens, 91 N.H. at 125, 14 A.2d at 642 (Allen, C.J., dissenting) (―poisons, intoxicants, certain 
weapons‖). 
 251. Id. at 122, 14 A.2d at 640. 
 252. Seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 299 S.W. 792, 793 (Tenn. 1927).  For New Hampshire‘s 
peculiarity, see also State ex rel Botkin v. Welsh, 251 N.W. 189, 200 (S.D. 1933).  Even Professor 
Robinson‘s A History of Taxation in New Hampshire glosses over this critical distinction. 
 253. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 576, 149 A. 321, 330 (1930). 
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Subsequent decisions reveal that the listed distinctions in Havens have 
been neither necessary nor sufficient to define a distinctive ―other class‖ of 
property separately from the ―characteristic event.‖ 
3. Developments by Type of Tax 
a. Other Sales and Commodity Taxes 
Questions remained about what sales of other commodities might be 
classified and whether tax rates could vary among them.  In 1947 the ad-
vice of the court was sought regarding a tax proposed on the sale of bottled 
soft drinks.
254
  The sponsors had cautiously proposed the same 15% levy 
and valuation method as the tobacco tax,
255
 so any issue was confined to 
classification.  The court said the tax was on a distinctive class of property, 
depending on a characteristic event, a sale.  There was no reference to the 
police power.  Instead, the court relied on other 
abundant reasons.  Soft drinks, like tobacco, are not necessaries, 
but may be properly classified as luxuries which were recognized 
by the dissenting judges in Havens v. Attorney General, as proper 
subjects for taxation.  Their fitness as subjects of taxation has been 
generally recognized.  Similar taxes have been imposed in many of 
the states.  The fact that this burden of the tax will be very widely 
distributed over almost the entire population of the state indicates 
that it is a good tax, according to accepted theories of taxation.  
The incidence of the tax depends upon a characteristic event, a 
sale, which has been held to a proper criterion for determining the 
incidence of a tax.
256
 
Two years later the same justices peremptorily condemned conversion 
of the electric utility franchise tax to one on kilowatt-hours of electricity 
produced, since it would have been a ―privilege tax.‖257  Although the levy 
might not have been strictly ad valorem,
258
 that seems to have been beside 
  
 254. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 52 A.2d 294 (1947). 
 255. ―The original copy of HB from the 1947 NH legislative session, section 5 ‗Tax Imposed‘, reads 
‗A tax is hereby imposed at the rate of fifteen percent upon the value of all bottled soft drinks sold at 
retail in this state measured by the usual selling price.‘‖  Letter from Z. Moore, Reference Librarian, 
N.H. State Library, to Marcus Hurn, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center (Feb. 9, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 256. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. at 508, 52 A.2d at 295. 
 257. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 543, 543, 64 A.2d 324, 324 (1949). 
 258. The levy was 1/4 mill per kilowatt hour.  Although the value of electricity in principle varies 
depending on when it is produced and consumed, a flat rate has been levied on consumption for some 
years without challenge.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-E:2 (2008) (adopted in 1997).  Even if kilowatt 
hours were not of equal value, an ad valorem tax on their sale could easily have been devised.  Alterna-
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the point at the time.  It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the briefs and 
arguments failed to reveal an attempted and salvageable sales or gross in-
come tax behind all the references to franchises and privileges.
259
  Some 
years later, the court used the flat rate distinction to ―harmonize‖ this deci-
sion with its approval of a proposed conversion of the tax on a franchise as 
property to a tax on income generated by a franchise.
260
  Many years later 
the court approved such a tax on the gross receipts of electric and gas utili-
ties, essentially a ―sales tax on the consumption of electricity and gas.‖261 
The same year a proposed tax on apples ―moving into the channels of 
commerce‖ was rejected as a forbidden ―occupation tax‖:262 
The raising and selling of apples involves ―only the ordinary trans-
actions of private life.‖  It contains ―no element subject to supervi-
sion either under the police power or as things affected with a pub-
lic use.‖  ―The mere statement of the general proposition is suffi-
cient to show that it unquestionably exceeds the legislative pow-
er.‖263 
As drafted the tax had a structural flaw (flat rate again), but the court ig-
nored that.
264
  That the proceeds of the apple levy were devoted to promot-
ing the sale and use of apples did not enter into the analysis.
265
  An effort 
similar to the apple excise regarding milk distribution in 1953 failed as 
either a tax or a fee.
266
  No mention was made in either the electric fran-
chise or milk distribution cases of the unique and elaborate police power 
regulations and price controls to which those industries were subject.
267
  
Contrary to its practice in some cases,
268
 the court made no effort to advise 
  
tively, the tobacco tax had reached an essentially flat rate per pack without violating valuation prin-
ciples.  Havens v. Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 135–36, 14 A.2d 636, 648 (1940) (Page, J., dissenting) 
(explaining the mechanism resulting in a flat tax). 
 259. There is now a consumption tax.  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 83-E:2 (2008). 
 260. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 549, 137 A.2d 726 (1958). 
 261. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 349, 358, 461 A.2d 132, 137 (1983) (per curiam). 
 262. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 555, 556, 65 A.2d 876, 877 (1949). 
 263. Id. (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 563, 138 A. 284, 286 (1927)). 
 264. The apple tax was one cent per bushel. 
 265. Either a fee theory or a special benefit assessment theory might have had some merit.  In a 
subsequent, more thorough analysis of a similar charge on milk distributors, the court held that estab-
lishing a fund for advertising and ―stimulating milk consumption is not in aid of regulation as the 
definition is understood,‖ although promotion of the sale of milk was ―not of itself an invalid purpose.‖  
Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.H. 527, 528–29, 96 A.2d 733, 734 (1953). 
 266. Id., 96 A.2d at 735. 
 267. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 497, 190 A. 713 (1937) (discussing milk dealer 
licensing and price control system). 
 268. The principal decision cited by the court had included an elaborate suggestion regarding how 
revenue could be raised from corporations without unconstitutional discrimination.  Opinion of the 
Justices, 82 N.H. at 566, 138 A. at 287.  Finding a proposal to exempt cigars from the tobacco tax of 
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the legislature how it could lawfully achieve its purposes in any of these 
decisions.  The criteria laid out in Havens and supplemented in the soft 
drinks decision were not used in the kilowatt, apple, or milk opinions. 
In 1951, confronting proposed sales taxes at differing rates on a mis-
cellaneous assortment of goods and services, the court had to reconcile its 
expansive language in the tobacco and soft drinks opinions with its duty to 
the constitution.  Leaving tobacco at 15%, the bill would have taxed restau-
rant meals at five, soft drinks at twenty, and admissions at five.
269
  The 
court maintained its view that tobacco was in a class by itself, and express-
ly stated it could be taxed ―at a rate distinct from the rate of a general sales 
tax.‖270  This was a bit awkward without resort to stronger justifications 
than laid down in Havens.  Just the week before—in the immediately pre-
ceding opinion in the official reports—the court had insisted that all in-
comes were one class and that intangibles and income from mercantile and 
manufacturing had to be taxed at one rate.
271
  No attempt was made to re-
concile the differing approaches to classification. 
On ―the issue of still further classification,‖ the court hypothesized jus-
tifiable distinctions based on various differences—sales of real property 
versus personal, of luxuries versus necessities.
272
  It wrote of permitted 
disproportion ―inherent in the tax itself,‖273 but cautioned against failure 
[t]o promote ―equal or honest division of [the] common burden.‖  
The danger of creating, by narrow classification, a tax upon occu-
pations or privileges is apparent.  ―Under our constitution, the 
power to tax is a power not to destroy the right of property by a 
discriminating process of classification or selection, but to equita-
bly defray the expense of protecting the right of property and other 
rights.‖274 
Referring to the ―complexities of the subject‖ and the limited time 
available for answering the inquiry, the court expressed its ―tentative con-
clusion‖ on the limited information before them.275  The justices were ―un-
able to declare the proposed bill constitutional.‖276  When it was proposed 
to tax cigarettes at 20% and other tobacco products at fifteen, the court saw 
  
doubtful constitutionality, the court suggested simply narrowing the taxable class to cigarettes.  Opi-
nion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 81 A.2d 851 (1951). 
 269. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 546, 547, 81 A.2d 853, 854 (1951). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. at 545, 81 A.2d at 853. 
 272. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. at 547–48, 81 A.2d at 854. 
 273. Id. at 548, 81 A.2d at 854. 
 274. Id. (citations omitted). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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no ―regulatory or just reason‖ for the difference and declared it unconstitu-
tional.
277
  A 1971 proposal would have taxed another assortment of servic-
es at a different rate from that on rooms and meals.
278
  The court still left 
open the possibility of information not before them justifying sub-
classification, but 
[a]lthough they may exist, no reasons have been presented to us 
―which may fairly be thought just and in the public interest‖ for the 
selection of the services taxed by RSA ch. 78-A (supp.) for taxa-




There was one class, not two.  While each activity in the two classes pre-
sumably had ―some unique trait,‖ the ―‗characteristic event‘ which justifies 
imposition of a tax differing from the general property tax is the same—
namely, the furnishing or sale of a service.‖280  Without equalizing the rates 
the bill would be unconstitutional.  With a uniform rate it could stand.
281
  
Tobacco was special—the default position is apparently ―a general sales 
tax‖ at one rate.282 
In contrast to the tobacco and soft drinks decisions, these later opinions 
warning of the dangers of narrow classification have no judicial elabora-
tion of distinctions justifying the classifications in issue.  The court has 
clearly applied the Havens criteria to goods and services in only two later 
cases: once to justify narrowing the class of taxable tobacco to ciga-
rettes,
283
 and once to validate a proposed tax on production of refined pe-
troleum products.
284
  Since then the court has apparently forsaken any ef-
fort to comprehensively define ―the legal requirements of classification.‖  
Instead it has fallen back on more general language like that in the soft 
drinks opinion requiring ―reasons which may fairly be thought just and in 





 277. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 517, 518, 113 A.2d 119, 120 (1955). 
 278. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 276 A.2d 817 (1971). 
 279. Id. at 135, 276 A.2d at 820 (citations omitted). 
 280. Id. at 134, 276 A.2d at 820 (citations omitted). 
 281. Id. at 135, 276 A.2d at 820. 
 282. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 546, 547, 81 A.2d 853, 854 (1951). 
 283. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 81 A.2d 851 (1951). 
 284. Opinion of the Justices, 114 N.H. 174, 317 A.2d 568 (1974). 
 285. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 509, 52 A.2d 294, 296 (1947); see also Starr v. Governor, 
148 N.H. 72, 802 A.2d 1227 (2002) (finding ―[n]o legitimate reason . . . presented to create . . . distinc-
tion‖ between ordinary retail sales of items and sale through prison commissary); Cagan‘s, Inc. v. N.H. 
Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 126 N.H. 239, 490 A.2d 1354 (1985) (stating no ―just reason‖ or ―rational 
basis‖ to distinguish sales of packaged food through vending machines or supermarkets). 
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b. Taxes on Incomes or Expenses 
As noted above, the court had approved taxes on various classes of in-
come some years before Havens.
286
  It did not have to confront two differ-
ent classes of income taxed at two different rates.  It had, however, said 
that the rate for taxation of incomes ―must be uniform.‖287 
In 1949 the court‘s advice was sought on a proposal to tax gross in-
comes.
288
  The House of Representatives described it as ―classifying gross 
income with regard to its type, rather than with regard to its recipient.‖289  
The court rejected varying rates for the ―types‖ of income: 
A gross income tax does not differ from a net income tax with re-
spect to the constitutional requirements.  Either form of income 
constitutes a class of property taxable under the 1903 amendment 
to our Constitution.  They are what is sometimes called property in 
motion as distinct from static property.  Both classes are subject, 
however, to the constitutional requirement of proportionality or 
equality of rate within each class.
290
 
On the same day, in response to a net income tax proposal, the court 
approved defining net income with reference to the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Code, observing that it would ―greatly facilitate the administration of the 
act.‖291  Later it made clear that a tax could be levied as a percentage of 
federally defined income, but not as a percentage of federal taxes.  To do 
so would introduce unconstitutional graduation.
292
 
When it was first proposed to except the stock in trade of merchants 
and manufacturers from taxable personal estate and replace it with a tax on 
their net income, the court reaffirmed its previous approval of such reclas-
sifications.
293
  However it also reaffirmed its position that all income taxes 
―constitute one class for purpose of establishing a rate,‖ expressly stating 
  
 286. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 190 A. 801 (1937) (earned incomes and rents); Opinion of 
the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 334 (1930) (earned incomes and income from intangibles); Opinion 
of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 138 A. 284 (1927) (net incomes from manufacturing and mercantile 
business). 
 287. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 570, 138 A. at 289; accord Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 
559, 149 A. 334. 
 288. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537, 64 A.2d 320 (1949). 
 289. Id. at 538, 64 A.2d at 320. 
 290. Id. at 539, 64 A.2d at 321 (emphasis added). 
 291. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 542, 64 A.2d 322, 323 (1949).  Once business profits came 
to be taxed, reference to the federal code and forms required considerable adjustment due to varying 
federal treatment of business entities, a practice unconstitutional in New Hampshire. 
 292. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 525, 113 A.2d 547 (1955). 
 293. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 81 A.2d 851 (1951). 
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The first opinion approving taxation of one type of income at a special 
rate came in 1958.
295
  The previous year the court had held the public utili-
ty franchise tax unconstitutional.
296
  It had been a traditional property tax 
on the intangible value of the franchise as measured by the difference be-
tween the value of the utility as a whole, based on capitalization of earn-
ings, and its net assets.
297
  The earnings part of the statutory formula was 
irrational and had long notoriously been ―a farce.‖298 
Facing budgetary shortfall and the need for a special legislative ses-
sion, the governor and executive council asked the court for comprehen-
sive advice about utility taxation.
299
  As a franchise was personal property, 
it could be taxed as ―estate,‖300 but that meant it would have to be taxed at 
the same rate and valuation as other property taxes at the state level (prin-
cipally the railroad tax).
301
  The statutory formula producing a differing 
valuation had therefore been unconstitutional.  However, franchises had 
been one of the two examples of ―other classes of property‖ listed in the 
1903 amendment, and incomes were also a recognized ―other class.‖  
Therefore it was the court‘s 
opinion that franchises of utilities may properly be taxed at a spe-
cial rate, distinct from that imposed upon incomes, or inheritances, 
or by the general property tax.  We see no reason why such a spe-
cial tax upon utility franchises may not validly be imposed by rea-
son of the receipt of income from the exercise of such franchises, 
or why it may not be levied at a special rate, and in proportion to 




The court was still speaking in terms of classes of taxes so it had a choice 
to make: income, franchise, or both.  It said, ―uniformity and proportionali-
ty must be maintained within this separate class of franchise taxes.‖303  As 
  
 294. Id. at 545, 81 A.2d at 853; see also Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 512, 513–14, 112 A.2d 44, 
45–46 (1955) (recapitulating the decisions that permitted the rate of income taxes to differ from the rate 
for ―the annual property taxes,‖ but requiring them to have their own ―common and uniform rate‖). 
 295. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 549, 137 A.2d 726 (1958). 
 296. Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 101 N.H. 154, 136 A.2d 600 (1957). 
 297. Id. at 158–59, 136 A.2d at 604. 
 298. Id. at 162, 136 A.2d at 607 (quoting a former chairman of the Tax Commission). 
 299. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. at 551, 137 A.2d at 728. 
 300. Id. at 556, 137 A.2d at 731. 
 301. Id. at 554–55, 137 A.2d at 730. 
 302. Id. at 557, 137 A.2d at 732. 
 303. Id. 
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with other classes, this one need not be comprehensive—inclusion of other 
income-generating franchises was not required.
304
 
But the court considered the issue of a rate differing from the IDT ―dif-
ficult.‖305  The rates could differ if the franchise tax were levied on net 
income, as the intangibles tax was on the gross.  That gross and net income 
were different classes had already been stated in the abstract.
306
  Yet, with-
out regard to gross or net, the court also said that franchise income could 
be separately classified, and ―[t]he class so selected is as distinctive as that 
of the class upon which the tax upon interest and dividends is imposed.‖307  
The tax had characteristics of both classes, and the distinctive qualities of 
the franchises justified a different rate on the incomes. 
There was another proposal in 1965 to repeal the troublesome stock in 
trade tax and replace it with an income tax at a uniform rate.
308
  It had one 
easily corrected flaw—a portion was characterized literally as a property 
tax, a misnomer that would have been fatal for lack of coordination with 
the other state property taxes.
309
  More seriously, however, the tax would 
not apply to income from personal services ―for which wages or salaries 
are received from an employer.‖310  Consequently the self-employed would 
pay the tax, while those doing the same work but drawing a salary from a 
corporation would not.  This not only made the tax easily circumvented; it 
was an unconstitutional discrimination among taxpayers.
311
  Coordinating 
the deductibility of compensation among various business forms has been a 
recurrent design problem in New Hampshire taxation as the state has in-
creasingly relied on definitions from a federal internal revenue code that 
promiscuously discriminates among taxpayers. 
In 1969 a legislatively created Citizens Task Force worked out a 
―Grand Bargain‖ to thoroughly revise the state‘s revenue structure.312  The 
tax on stock in trade and many other business-related classes of personal 
property would be repealed.
313
  A tax on the net profits of any corporation, 
partnership, or proprietorship would take its place, with revenue sharing 
compensation provided to cities and towns to reduce their tax bases.
314
  
Definitions were based on the federal internal revenue code, but unincor-
  
 304. Id. at 558, 137 A.2d at 732.  The court cited Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 
(1930), which turned on the selective power as applied to taxation of franchises as personal estate. 
 305. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. at 558, 137 A.2d at 733. 
 306. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537, 539, 64 A.2d 320, 321 (1949). 
 307. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. at 558, 137 A.2d at 733. 
 308. Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.H. 202, 208 A.2d 458 (1965). 
 309. Id. at 204, 208 A.2d at 460. 
 310. Id. at 206, 208 A.2d at 461. 
 311. Id., 208 A.2d at 462. 
 312. Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 117, 262 A.2d 290 (1970) (per curiam). 
 313. Id. at 12122, 262 A.2d at 29394. 
 314. Id. 
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porated entities were allowed a state deduction for the value of owners‘ 
services to equalize the treatment of all business forms.  State credits or 
exclusions were designed to avoid possible double taxation where taxes on 
other revenue streams overlapped with business profits.  In anticipation of 
a special legislative session, the governor and council asked the court‘s 
advice on the constitutionality of the proposal; the court saw no constitu-
tional flaws.
315
  This was the genesis of the business profits tax (BPT). 
In its scrutiny of the proposed BPT, the court had to distinguish other 
classes of property taxed differently or implicitly created where the BPT 
base overlapped them.  The IDT rate could differ as it was levied on gross 
income.  To the extent interest and dividends were taxed under the IDT, 
that income was excluded from the BPT base.  This, however, had the ef-
fect of denying businesses the benefit of certain exemptions allowed under 
the IDT and also of creating a different effective rate for some intangible 
business income.  However, the court said business income could be ―clas-
sified separately from salaries, wages, and unearned income of individu-
als,‖ and taxed at a rate differing from intangibles ―held to the accounts of 
nonbusiness interests.‖316  As to the better rate for business income from 




The state taxes on railroads and telephone companies were traditional 
property taxes that did not need to be coordinated with an income tax.  The 
taxes on gas and electric franchise income were of a distinct class justify-
ing a different rate, and making their higher taxes a credit against the BPT 
prevented double taxation.
318
  The tax on interest and dividends paid out by 
banks was called a franchise tax and remained in a class by itself.
319
  Taxes 
on insurance companies were distinguished on the traditional theory that 
they were not taxes but voluntary payments for special privileges.
320
 
At about the same time it was signaling that sales of ordinary goods 
and services might fit in only one or two classes, each with a common 
rate,
321
 the court was allowing a profusion of distinct categories of income: 
gross or net; business receipts, wages and salaries, or unearned income; of 
the latter, rents or interest and dividends; franchise income with sub-
classes of franchises.  More distinct classes were to come (presumably sub-
divisible by other recognized factors): earnings of non-resident commu-
  
 315. Id. at 125, 262 A.2d at 296. 
 316. Id. at 123, 262 A.2d at 295. 
 317. Id. at 124, 262 A.2d at 296. 
 318. Id., 262 A.2d at 295. 
 319. Id., 262 A.2d at 296. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 134, 276 A.2d 817, 820 (1971) (per curiam) (―[T]he 
‗characteristic event‘ . . . is the same—namely, the furnishing or sale of a service.‖). 
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ters;
322
 capital gains, both ordinary and from residences;
323
 interest and 
dividends paid by domestic financial institutions;
324
 and net business prof-
its with compensation added back.
325
  Double taxation issues and the com-
plexities of taxing multi-state or international business groups have also 
produced many credits and exemptions sometimes indifferently referred to 
as acts of classification.
326
  Except for franchised utilities, however, the 
court was skeptical of classification of income by industry.  In 1975 it was 
proposed to exclude from the reach of the business profits tax net income 
derived from sales of spirits and wine ―under the express direction of, or 
under an agreement with, the State liquor commission for sale to the com-
mission.‖327  With no apparent irony, the court said: 
If the effect of the proposal is to exempt certain taxpayers, i.e. 
those who sell ―spirits and wines‖ to the State liquor commission, 
from this State‘s general business profits tax, it is unconstitutional.  
If, however, Senate bill No. 138 merely classifies net income from 
the sale of ―spirits and wines‖ to the State liquor commission as 
property exempt from taxation and if a ―just reason‖ can be found 
for doing so, it is constitutional.
328
 
The justices indulged in no speculation about possible ―just reasons‖ and 
said no more.  
A separate corporate income tax remained forbidden.
329
  However, the 
BPT‘s necessary allowance of a reasonable compensation deduction for 
working owners of unincorporated businesses meant that many small busi-
nesses, particularly professional and other service businesses, paid little or 
no tax.  The narrow incidence of the BPT in practice and its volatility in 
relation to the business cycle led to repeated efforts to find a way to reach 
more businesses that was both politically viable and constitutional.
330
 
In 1981 the legislature created a complicated minimum business tax of 
$250 on any business with gross income over $12,000 and insufficient 
  
 322. Austin v. State Tax Comm‘n, 114 N.H. 137, 316 A.2d 165 (1974), rev’d, Austin v. New Hamp-
shire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975). 
 323. Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 512, 374 A.2d 964 (1977). 
 324. Smith v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 692 A.2d 486 (1997). 
 325. Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 584 A.2d 1342 (1990) (neither net nor gross). 
 326. For example, see the difficulties with the Water‘s Edge Taxation Bill reviewed in Opinion of the 
Justices, 128 N.H. 1, 509 A.2d 734 (1986).  Part II.D.4.a, infra, discusses double taxation. 
 327. Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 306, 308, 339 A.2d 450, 451 (1975) (per curiam). 
 328. Id. at 309, 339 A.2d at 452 (citations omitted). 
 329. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 206, 278 A.2d 348 (1971) (per curiam).  This opinion repu-
diated, sub silentio, a bizarre advisory opinion delivered earlier that year approving a corporate net 
income tax in Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 129, 276 A.2d 489 (1971) (per curiam). 
 330. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 296, 460 A.2d 93 (1983) (per curiam) (examining 
the request of the House of Representatives). 
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profit to trigger the BPT.
331
  Applying a flat rate to varying income neces-
sarily produces effective rates that are regressively graduated.
332
  Despite 
an effort to distinguish between gross and net, the formula reached the 
same income—the purported classes were indistinguishable.333  From a 
different perspective, there was no ―just reason‖ to tax income below the 
BPT threshold at a higher rate that that above.
334
  The tax was void ab in-
itio and refunds were due.
335
  Further experiments in this direction were 
pre-tested through advisory opinions. 
The next effort was to define two classes of business profits, one 
broadly defined and taxed at 1%, the other the existing BPT class, then 
taxed at 8.75%.  They were to be alternatives, a business being required to 
pay whichever was greater.
336
  The court saw both as ―essentially classifi-
cations of business income.‖337  Therefore, there was one class of property 
taxed at two different rates.  What really was going on was a classification 
of taxpayers, not property.  However laudable its motive, the legislature 
―may not create alternative systems of taxation which inevitably result in 
two classes of taxpayers, paying differing rates of tax on essentially the 
same class of property, business income.‖338  In the same opinion the court 
approved a proposal to reconfigure the BPT by adding back all compensa-
tion paid, granting a uniform $25,000 deduction for all entities, and taxing 
at a lower rate.
339
  While constitutional, it was not politically successful. 
Later that month the court advised on another two-class proposal under 
which tax paid at a low rate on the more broadly defined base could be 
taken as a credit against the BPT.
340
  Because the court still saw the two 
classes as essentially the same, differential rates doomed the proposal.
341
  
The idea of two layers with a credit however, was itself viable and ulti-
mately produced the solution.  The court simply required that the broader 
low rate tax be on a clearly different class of property such as, it suggested, 
  
 331. Johnson & Porter Realty Co. v. Comm‘r of Revenue Admin., 122 N.H. 696, 448 A.2d 435 
(1982). 
 332. Id. at 698, 448 A.2d at 436. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 699, 448 A.2d at 436. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 296, 460 A.2d 93 (1983) (per curiam). 
 337. Id. at 301, 460 A.2d at 97. 
 338. Id. at 302, 460 A.2d at 97.  There was another flaw in the class of alternate business profits.  
Taxpayers were given a choice of two different adjustment systems, which also had the effect of classi-
fying taxpayers.  Id. at 300, 460 A.2d at 96. 
 339. Id. at 304–08, 460 A.2d at 98–102. 
 340. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 344, 461 A.2d 129 (1983) (per curiam). 
 341. Id. at 347, 461 A.2d at 130. 
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compensation or payroll.
342
  There was another decade of false starts before 
the legislature took this advice. 
One idea was to cap BPT compensation deductions at $100,000 per 
employee.  ―The effect . . . would be to impose differing tax burdens and 
differing [effective] tax rates on business organizations which have iden-
tical gross income and aggregate reasonable compensation expenses.‖343  
Those with any employees paid more than the cap would, to that extent, 
pay tax at a higher rate than others.  This ―would violate the constitutional 
principle that the legislature must substantially treat all business entities 
uniformly and equally.‖344  Repealing all the compensation deductions and 
replacing them with a flat credit per worker (pro-rated for part-timers un-
der 1,800 hours per year) was seen as having the same flaw.
345
  The court 
declared the credit proposal unconstitutional despite a stated purpose to 
encourage employment.
346
  As employment is a recognized public purpose 
justifying tax exemptions,
347
 this seems to have been a misstep by the 
court.  Alternatively, the court may have concluded that other motives and 
likely practical effects outweighed that recital.  It is in any case hard to 
reconcile with the ―rational basis‖ analysis that the court was applying in 
other tax classification cases.
348
 
The solution suggested by the court in 1983 was adopted in 1993 with 
the business enterprise tax (BET).  Instead of some variation of business 
income, the BET base is roughly business expenses.  It is the sum of com-
pensation, interest, or dividends paid out—the cost of labor and most capi-
tal.
349
  It comes out of the third part of the income equation (gross minus 
cost equals net), manifestly a different class of property in motion.  Levied 
at a low rate and credited against the BPT, the BET can reach all operating 
businesses.  Those operating at no or low BPT net because of compensa-
tion paid to owners now contribute to state revenues.  What the constitu-
tion prohibited in one tax was, through deft use of the classification power, 
possible with two coordinated taxes. 
  
 342. Id. at 348, 461 A.2d at 131. 
 343. Opinion of the Justices, 131 N.H. 640, 643, 557 A.2d 273, 275 (1989) (per curiam). 
 344. Id. (citations omitted). 
 345. Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783, 584 A.2d 1342, 1347 (1990) (per curiam). 
 346. Id. at 779, 584 A.2d at 1343. 
 347. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 199, 278 A.2d 357 (1971) (per curiam); see also 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-A:5, VII (2008) (five-year job creation credit against BPT). 
 348. E.g., Cagan‘s, Inc. v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 126 N.H. 239, 490 A.2d 1354 (1985). 
 349. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-E:1, IX.  The cost of capital in the form of intellectual property is 
not taxed—royalties are not included in the base. 
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c. Franchises 
Much of this ground has already been covered.  It has long been settled 
that franchises are intangible personal property, taxable ad valorem.
350
  The 
legislature may tax some franchises and not others.
351
  So long as they were 
so taxed, it was done at the common rate.
352
  Franchises are also listed in 
the 1903 amendment among ―other classes of property.‖  However, in the 
modern era the court ruled that when they are taxed directly as property, 
the common rate is required,
353
 as is a rational valuation formula.
354
 
Income from franchises can be taxed as a class of dynamic property.
355
  
When it is, it may be taxed at a rate differing from other income taxes.
356
  




d. Property Taxes 
The modern history of traditional property taxes, the ancient tax on 
―estates,‖ does not involve constitutional issues directly.  The nineteenth-
century decisions on proportionality remain sound.  All estates in a given 
taxing jurisdiction are to be taxed at a uniform rate and valuation.  If, de-
spite the statutory command to appraise property at full value, a different 
proportion in fact prevails, the constitutional proportionality rule controls.  
It is neither necessary nor sufficient to show flawed assessment methodol-
ogy—―disproportionality, and not methodology, is the linchpin.‖358  To 
secure abatement, the taxpayer must show his appraisal is above the aver-
age of other property in the taxing district.
359
  When differing types of 
property in the base are generally assessed at differing proportions of val-
ue, a taxpayer need not compare subclasses—the ratio of full value of all 
district property to the total of assessed values is the test.
360
  There is one 
  
 350. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 149 A. 321 (1930); Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 
138 A. 284 (1927). 
 351. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. at 569, 149 A. at 326. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 549, 554, 137 A.2d 726, 733 (1958). 
 354. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 101 N.H. 154, 136 A.2d 600 (1957). 
 355. Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. at 558, 137 A.2d at 733. 
 356. Id. 
 357. In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 122 N.H. 919, 451 A.2d 1321 (1982). 
 358. Porter v. Town of Sanbornton, 150 N.H. 363, 369, 840 A.2d 778, 784 (2003). 
 359. In re Town of Sunapee, 126 N.H. 214, 489 A.2d 153 (1985); Berthiaume v. City of Nashua, 118 
N.H. 646, 392 A.2d 143 (1978); Rollins v. City of Dover, 93 N.H. 448, 44 A.2d 113 (1945). 
 360. See Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. Claremont, 98 N.H. 446, 102 A.2d 512 (1954); accord Town of 
Sunapee, 126 N.H. at 214, 489 A.2d at 153.  In the days of the stock-in-trade tax, the method of calcu-
lating it ensured current market values, while land, buildings, and waterpower tend to lag.  Bemis 
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recently developed exception to the general rule requiring proof of actual 
disproportionality to secure an abatement.  If a similarly situated class of 
persons is subject to a tax, and, with no rational basis, some are singled out 
for tax and others not taxed at all, there is an independent violation of 




Taxes on estates are now primarily land taxes.
362
  As a legislative and 
judicial dialectic developed and defined the power to tax other classes of 
property, most personal property taxation flowed into the new channels.  
The general tax on personal estate was repealed in 1981.
363
  Utility taxes 
are now on receipts for or consumption of the service, not the franchises 
themselves.  With the real property transfer tax, even land has developed a 
dynamic side.
364
  However, less land is taxable at full value.  Concerns 
about conservation, agriculture, and open space led to the constitutional 
amendment of 1968 permitting valuation of land based on ―current use.‖365  
Exemptions have accumulated for various public purposes.
366
  Yet these 
real property taxes are the main support of local government.  Consequent-
ly the modern cases have involved the increasing pressure for tax relief and 
challenges to exemptions.
367
  The state‘s long-running struggle over school 
funding also put state-level general property taxes on the table, sharpening 
some controversies and obliging the court to declare that legislative power 
to classify and exempt could not be used to defeat the constitutional re-




shows that when a district allowed this without adjustment, a merchant taxed mostly on stock in trade 
could always secure an abatement. 
 361. See Verizon New England, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 156 N.H. 624, 940 A.2d 237 (2007) (in-
volving taxation for use of public property under an exception to the general exemption provided for in 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:23, I(b) (2008)). 
 362. There are, of course, others.  For example, the railroad tax remains.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
82:1. 
 363. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:15 (stating that the statute in question was repealed in 1981). 
 364. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-B:1. 
 365. ―The general court may provide for the assessment of any class of real estate at valuations based 
upon the current use thereof.‖  N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 5-b (1968); see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-A:1 
(involving the ―Declaration of Public Interest‖).  Note that this permits different assessment, but not 
variation of the tax rate. 
 366. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:12-a (Water and Air Pollution Control Facilities); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 72:37-a (Improvements to Assist Persons With Disabilities); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
72:38 (dealing with aviation facilities); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:76 (dealing with new commercial 
or industrial construction). 
 367. See, e.g., Town of Peterborough v. MacDowell Colony, Inc., 157 N.H. 1, 943 A.2d 768 (2008) 
(involving charitable uses); In re Town of Rindge, 158 N.H. 21, 959 A.2d 188 (2008) (involving uni-
versity wastewater treatment plant as pollution control facility); In re Kat Paw Acres Trust, 156 N.H. 
536, 937 A.2d 925 (2007) (involving improvements to assist persons with disabilities); In re Town of 
Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 911 A.2d 1 (2006) (involving solid waste facility; statute subsequently 
changed). 
 368; Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 892, 712 A.2d 1080 (1998). 
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4. Other Developments 
a. Tax Relief 
The first modern decision on exemptions for tax relief appears to be an 
advisory opinion in 1963.
369
  The questions involved additional exemptions 
from the interest and dividends tax for taxpayers aged sixty-five and over 
and for the totally disabled, neither with a means test.
370
  In approving the 
age exemption, the court broke with older decisions without acknowledg-
ing it had done so. 
When analyzing proposals in 1927 to levy a tax on all business income 
with a $2,000 exemption and to levy the IDC only on income above 
$2,000, the court said it was not merely a matter of classification.  ―The 
terminology used does not control.  The substance of the provision must be 
considered.  The question is one of power to grant exemption.‖371  It then 
struggled to define ―general‖ as opposed to ―special‖ exemptions, reviewed 
various grounds for minimum amounts, and made some very broad state-
ments about legislative discretion.
372
  The only specific grounds for a low-
income exemption was that ―[t]he recipient of the small income is not in a 
position to pay, and the exemption tends to promote thrift.‖373  At the end, 
the court hedged: ―the problem of legislative power to make quantitative 
exceptions from taxability is a difficult one.  There are substantial argu-
ments for either view.  There are difficulties in attempting to define limita-
tions, if the power is thought to exist.‖374 
By 1930 the court had resolved its doubts.  Substantial quantitative ex-
emptions were personal, not matters of property classification: 
The question presented concerns the power to exempt because of 
the amount of income received by the individual.  It does not relate 
to the power to grant a general exemption as to a certain class of 
income.  Such personal exemptions are granted upon a theory that 
everyone should have a certain amount of income tax free, and, 
except in a general way, they have no relation to the nature of the 
income.  The ground upon which a substantial quantitative person-
  
 
 369. Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.H. 22, 192 A.2d 22 (1963). 
 370. Id. 
 371. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570, 138 A. 284, 289 (1927). 
 372. Id. at 570–75, 138 A. at 289–91. 
 373. Id. at 571, 138 A. at 289. 
 374. Id. at 575, 138 A. at 291. 
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Quantitative personal exemptions above some ability to pay threshold were 
simply a way of importing progressivity, and ―our constitution does not 
permit the laying of a graduated or progressive tax.  A tax levy cannot be 
sustained here upon any theory that the richer one is the higher his tax rate 
should be.‖376  The court concluded that particular amounts lower than 
those in the proposal were the most that could be thought reasonable.
377
  
The next year the court declared that public benefits based on age without 
a means test would violate both the pensions clause of the constitution
378
 
and the prohibition on taxes for private purposes found in part I, article 12 
and part II, article 6.
379
  A backdoor way of achieving an age exemption by 




Despite this, the 1963 opinion said a blanket, quantitative exemption 
based on age was a permissible classification.  ―While . . . age and poverty 
are by no means synonymous, . . . in many cases they may have some 
common attributes. . . . [and] poverty and misfortune have long been re-
garded as just grounds of relief.‖381  The court cited eligibility for old age 
assistance and medical assistance to the aged at age sixty-five, and the ex-
emption from poll tax at age seventy.
382
  Without articulating the connec-
tion, it suggested that retirement ages had some relationship to income 
from ―sources other than earnings.‖383  Remarkably, the court cited its 
1930 opinion without comment as if it supported this radical departure, and 
it ignored the 1931 opinion on pensions.
384
  It seems unlikely the court 
would have permitted sending a check to every resident over the age of 
sixty-four.  Yet by conflating classification of property with personal ex-
emptions the court had upheld a classification of persons on speculative 
grounds without the traditional requirement of a public purpose sufficient 
to justify a public expenditure. 
When the more visible and politically touchy property tax was in-
volved, proponents of relief for the elderly were more circumspect.  A 
means test was built into a 1970 bill to exempt the first $5,000 of assessed 
  
 375. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571, 149 A. 321, 327 (1930). 
 376. Id., 149 A. at 328. 
 377. Id. at 572, 149 A. at 328. 
 378. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 36 (1784). 
 379. Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 A. 217 (1931). 
 380. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 506, 190 A. 801, 806 (1937). 
 381. Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.H. 22, 24, 192 A.2d 22, 23 (1963) (citations omitted). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. 
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value of residences owned by those aged seventy or more.
385
  The court, 
with no reference to the means test, declared the bill consistent with the 
state constitution in one long quotation from its 1965 IDT opinion.
386
 
A 1971 income tax proposal included a limited property tax ―circuit-
breaker‖ in the form of a credit for property taxes or, to the extent the tax-
payer did not owe property taxes, a direct payment.
387
  The credit was de-
signed to provide limited relief for low- and moderate-income households 
from tax on their residences, whether owned or rented.  By working 
through an income tax, the expense would be borne by the state rather than 
the municipalities.  There were three limitations: Only property tax in 
excess of 6% of household income was considered; no more than $900 of 
that excess could be counted; and the credit was capped at $300.
388
  Faced 
with potential cash payouts and a scheme classifying people by income and 
tax burden, the court invoked traditional exemption analysis.  The limita-
tions were ―an essential prerequisite to constitutionality.‖389  The court 
quoted the pension decision‘s prohibition on ―assignment of public funds 
to other than public purposes,‖ and, citing that decision, said ―[p]ublic as-
sistance, afforded in a limited way and without discrimination, to persons 
eligible therefor [sic] by reason of a lack of means of their own, is a recog-
nized exercise of the protective power.‖390  Echoing the depression-era 
decisions, the court apparently made its own determination that the amount 
involved was ―reasonable.‖391  A later proposal to ―return‖ state funds to 
homeowners failed as discriminating among taxpayers.  ―A rebate out of 
public funds to some taxpayers but not others would clearly constitute dis-
crimination unless sustainable upon grounds of reasonable classifica-
tion.‖392 
The one major property tax relief measure to have been adopted was 
declared unconstitutional in 1974.
393
  It was a local-option system under 
which cities and towns could adopt a partial exemption from local taxes 
(not county or state) for owner-occupied residential property.  The court 
discussed the public-purpose aspect of the exemption extensively, finding 
encouragement of home ownership itself a legitimate public purpose.
394
  
Thus a means test was not strictly necessary, and the lack of provision for 
  
 385. Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 206, 266 A.2d 111 (1970) (per curiam). 
 386. Id. at 208, 266 A.2d at 113. 
 387. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 136, 276 A.2d 821 (1971). 
 388. Id. at 141, 276 A.2d at 823–24. 
 389. Id., 276 A.2d at 824. 
 390. Id. at 142, 276 A.2d at 824. 
 391. Id.  This seems to differ from ―not unreasonable.‖ 
 392. Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 87, 89, 302 A.2d 112, 114 (1973) (per curiam). 
 393. Felder v. City of Portsmouth, 114 N.H. 573, 324 A.2d 708 (1974). 
 394. Id. at 577, 276 A.2d at 710. 
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renters irrelevant.
395
  The previous year‘s opinion regarding state payments 
to homeowners was distinguished, as that scheme ―displaye[d] overtones 
of public welfare‖ with ―no criteria by which to limit its assistance to those 
homeowners in financial straits.‖396  The scheme, unfortunately, had a fatal 
design flaw.  Instead of exempting the first dollars of home valuation, the 
statute applied the full tax rate on the first $8,000, exempted the next 
$5,000 ($10,000 for taxpayers over age sixty-five), and applied the full tax 
rate to the anything higher.  The reason for taxing the first $8,000 was to 
assure that every homeowner paid some taxes to the community.
397
  How-
ever, the result was that only those with properties assessed at $8,000 or 
less
398
 paid the full tax rate, which had increased 10% to fund the exemp-
tion.
399
  There were other paradoxical effects, but this was sufficient: ―In 
our view the law is unconstitutional because the minimum valuation provi-
sion discriminates against the poor by unreasonably raising their taxes to 
finance tax relief for persons owning more expensive homes.‖400 
b. Exemptions for Economic Development 
Exemptions to encourage economic development were once of uncer-
tain constitutionality.  In 1929 the court decided Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town 
of Gilsum.
401
  A special act had authorized ―the town of Gilsum . . . to ex-
empt from taxation for a term of not more than ten years a new woolen 
mill and the machinery to be installed therein proposed to be erected in 
said town by or for the Eyer Woolen Mill.‖402  The actual issue was easy—
the exemption was unique and granted to a named private business, thus 
violating the principle of equality.
403
  However, the court wrote extensively 
about broader issues, and much of this dictum argues that industrial devel-
opment was an insufficient public purpose to justify tax exemption.  ―Aid-
ing a private manufacturing corporation is not a public purpose.‖404  A few 
years later the court held the same view: 
The indirect public advantage of industrial welfare and general 
prosperity is not a valid reason for the aid.  Even if the public ad-
  
 395. Id. at 577–78, 324 A.2d at 710–11. 
 396. Id. at 578, 324 A.2d at 710. 
 397. Id. at 579, 324 A.2d at 711. 
 398. This was not a tiny class, especially considering that these were 1974 dollars and both mobile 
homes and condominiums were covered. 
 399. Felder, 114 N.H. at 576, 324 A.2d at 709. 
 400. Id. at 579, 324 A.2d at 711. 
 401. 84 N.H. 1, 146 A. 511 (1929). 
 402. Id. at 3, 146 A. at 512. 
 403. Id. at 16, 146 at 519. 
 404. Id. 
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vantage takes specific form, such as work for those in need of em-
ployment and without employment dependent on public assistance, 
public aid to the employer is a violation of the constitutional prin-
ciple against taxation for private purposes.
405
 
Eyers Woolen Co. has been frequently cited for various propositions, but 
its view of the legitimacy of aid to industry by uniform, general exemp-
tions was repudiated in the modern era: 
The State and its citizens presumably receive direct benefits from 
tax exemptions for industrial construction by attracting new indus-
tries into the State and keeping existing industry here, thereby 
creating economic growth.  Since all industrial uses that meet the 
statutory definition may qualify for limited tax exemptions, the bill 
does not improperly classify property.  The legislature has deter-
mined that the public welfare would benefit from the encourage-
ment of industrial construction in the State and that this may be ac-
complished through the proposed bill.  The purpose of stimulating 
economic growth is one properly within the legislature‘s discretion 
in acting for the welfare of the state.
406
 
This seems to have replaced an intermediate position that allowed the ex-
emption of industrial facilities, but only if a ―just share of the public ex-
pense‖ was secured through a payment in lieu of taxes, set by a quasi-
judicial body taking into account all relevant factors including ―employ-
ment opportunities to be created or retained.‖407 
c. Double Taxation 
Double taxation has been described as one form of disproportionali-
ty.
408
  It comes in two kinds—constitutional or not.  Nineteenth-century 
cases on double taxation lost their meaning with the 1903 amendment.  
When for a given level of government there was only one rate and valua-
tion for any property taxed, any duplication was unconstitutional.  Then 
problems arose with questions such as whether the stock of a corporation, 
taxed to the shareholder in his town of residence, was the same property as 
  
 405. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 488, 190 A. 425, 428 (1937). 
 406. Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 95, 100, 697 A.2d 120, 123 (1997) (citations omitted) (involv-
ing municipal tax exemptions for industrial construction); see also Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 
374, 746 A.2d 981 (1999) (involving municipal tax exemptions for electric utility on personal proper-
ty). 
 407. Eltra Corp. v. Town of Hopkinton, 119 N.H. 907, 914, 409 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1979).  Payments 
in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) remain a feature of New Hampshire exemption provisions. 
 408. Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 126, 130, 130 A. 357, 359 (1925).  
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the physical assets of that corporation taxed in their location.
409
  From the 
beginning, however, proportionality has been judged only within taxing 
jurisdictions—district, municipality, county, or state.410  A statewide prop-




When the 1903 amendment permitted taxation on ―other classes of 
property‖ in addition to taxes on estates (rather than in place of them), it 
necessarily permitted the same property to be taxed in two or more ways 
depending on what classes it fit into and the extent to which they over-
lapped.  ―Disproportion in the tax, in the sense that taxes are laid in several 
ways rather than in one way, is not objectionable, in the absence of some 
constitutional prohibition of such procedure.  The power to impose dispro-
portional taxes is put beyond question when it is specifically permitted by 
constitutional provisions.‖412  What was once denounced as an unconstitu-
tional assertion of ―despotic power‖413 is now permissible, even routine. 
Double taxation is now a problem of classification.  If a given dollar or 
thing fits within or passes through two or more classes, it may constitu-
tionally be subject to two or more taxes if the classes are so defined that 
―the incidence of the two taxes is determined by separate and distinct fac-
tors.‖414  This is frequently misunderstood.  The court itself took some time 
to work out the distinction.  It had briefly taken the position that a net prof-
it tax on a business paying gross sales tax would be unconstitutionally 
double,
415
 but, noting that profit was net of expenses (which would include 
the sales tax), it later concluded each tax‘s incidence was different and 
reversed its position.
416
  The focus is on practical effect rather than tax-
onomy—although the gasoline ―toll‖ is not even a tax, the court has said 
gasoline would have to be exempted from a general sales tax.
417
  As recent-
ly as 1951, the House of Representatives was concerned that taxing goods 
as personal estate in the manufacturing process might be incompatible with 
a retail sales tax on the same goods.  It was not.
418
  Nor did the railroad tax 
  
 409. The court found that it was the same property.  Smith v. Burley, 9 N.H. 423, 427 (1838). 
 410. See generally Boston, Concord, & Montreal R.R. v. State, 60 N.H. 87 (1880). 
 411. Opinion of the Justices, 112 N.H. 32, 35, 287 A.2d 756, 758 (1972) (discussing the homestead 
exemptions at state level). 
 412. Conner, 82 N.H. at 130, 130 A. at 359. 
 413. Robinson v. Dover, 59 N.H. 521, 524 (1880). 
 414. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 577, 149 A. 321, 330 (1930), criticized by Opinion of the 
Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 190 A. 801(1937). 
 415. Id. 
 416. Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. at 504, 190 A. at 805. 
 417. Id. at 805. 
 418. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 533, 53637, 81 A.2d 845, 849 (1951). 
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on tangible property need to be credited against the BPT: ―the incidence of 
the two taxes is determined by separate and distinct factors.‖419 
Difficulties developed with the proliferation of classes of taxable in-
come.  The interest and dividends tax first occupied the field.  Each pro-
posal to adopt a more general income tax had to deal with it.
420
  One ver-
sion of the proposed gross income tax of 1949 provided for exempting 
income subject to the IDT.
421
  As the tax was pervasively flawed, the court 
did not reach that issue.  In 1965, the proponents of a net income tax over-
looked the layering, and the court held that stacking another income tax on 
the IDT would be unconstitutionally double.
422
  The successful business 
profits tax of 1970 excluded from the definition of income any income that 
had been taxed under the IDT.
423
  In all of these cases, the general income 
tax rate was different from the IDT.  Although the incidence of two classes 
of tax might be so similar they could not be stacked, they could still be 
sufficiently distinct to justify different rates.  ―The Constitution does not 
require the rate of a tax upon net income to be uniform with that of the 
existing interest and dividends tax, which is a tax upon certain gross in-
come, now fixed at 4 1/4%.‖424  Similarly, although stacking was avoided 
by allowing a BPT credit, there was no constitutional problem in the dif-
ference between the BPT and the significantly higher tax on electric and 
gas franchise income.
425
  While capital gains have been held sufficiently 
distinct from business profits to be taxed at a different rate, business capital 
gains could not be subject to double taxation as both.
426
 
There is also potential for double taxation on receipt by a shareholder 
(individual or corporate) of dividend income that may have already been 
taxed as dividend income of the corporation.  This is the reason corpora-
tions are not subject to the IDT itself.
427
  Similarly, a parent subject to the 
BPT has a deduction for dividends received from subsidiaries also paying 
  
 419. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 210, 212, 279 A.2d 741, 742 (1971). 
 420. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. at 500, 190 A. at 801.  One income tax proposal in 
1971 would have solved the problem by repealing the IDT.  Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 136, 137, 
276 A.2d 821, 821 (1971). 
 421. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 537, 538, 64 A.2d 320, 320 (1949). 
 422. Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.H. 202, 207, 208 A.2d 458, 462 (1965). 
 423. Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 117, 120, 262 A.2d 290, 293 (1970). 
 424. Id. at 122, 262 A.2d at 295. 
 425. Id. at 120, 262 A.2d at 293. 
 426. Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 512, 517, 374 A.2d 964, 966–67 (1977). 
 427. Conner v. State, 82 N.H. 126, 132, 130 A. 357, 360 (1925).  They are still excluded.  N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 77:3 (2008).  Partnerships and LLCs are subject to the tax, but distributions to the part-
ners or members are not.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:15. 
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the tax.
428
  The BET deals with a similar cascading problem through de-
ductions for previously taxed distributions.
429
 
The court‘s position that classes could be sufficiently distinct to justify 
differential rates, but sufficiently similar to justify a credit or exclusion to 
avoid double taxation, is what made our present combination of the BPT 




The New Hampshire Constitution prohibits retrospective laws.
431
  A 
retrospective law is one that ―takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or 
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations al-
ready past . . . .‖432  Imposition of a new tax on transactions completed in 
prior years is prohibited.
433
  However, the taxable event may trigger recog-




The few cases on retrospective taxation are fairly recent.  At one point 
a bare majority of the court advised that a change in the rate of the land use 
change tax after the owner had opted for current use valuation would be 
unconstitutionally retrospective.
435
  In a subsequent contested case, the 
court unanimously renounced that view and adopted that of the dissen-
ters.
436
  The taxability of property defined by an act or event is determined 
by the law at the time of the act or event, not by some prior law on which 
the taxpayer may have relied.  As the legislature lacks power to grant an 
irrevocable exemption, repealing one cannot be retrospective.
437
  However, 
a statute may not retroactively annul a contract for a payment in lieu of 




 428. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-A:4(IV) (since repealed); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm‘r, 154 N.H. 457, 
45859, 914 A.2d 246, 248 (2006). 
 429. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-E:3(II), (III). 
 430. See supra Part II.C. 
 431. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 23 (1784). 
 432. Woart v. Winnick, 3 N.H. 473, 479 (1826) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Soc‘y for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1807) (No. 13,156). 
 433. Cagan‘s, Inc. v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 126 N.H. 239, 249, 490 A.2d 1345, 1361 
(1985). 
 434. Shangri-La, Inc. v. State, 113 N.H. 440, 442, 309 A.2d 285, 287 (1973). 
 435. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. 270, 627 A.2d 92 (1993), retreated from by 
Tyler Rd. Dev. Corp. v. Town of Londonderry, 145 N.H. 615, 766 A.2d 267 (2000). 
 436. Tyler Rd. Dev. Corp., 145 N.H. at 617, 766 A.2d at 270. 
 437. See generally Trs. of Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Town of Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940). 
 438. Lower Vill. Hydroelectric Assocs. v. City of Claremont, 147 N.H. 73, 76, 782 A.2d 897, 900 
(2001). 
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One decision has apparently permitted a degree of retrospectivity.  In 
Estate of Kennett v. State,
439
 the legislature had adopted a business profits 
tax.  The statute became effective April 22, 1970, but by express terms 
applied to gross business profits earned after January 1, 1970.  The transac-
tions in question were two sales of real estate pursuant to options.
440
  The 
options were ―exercised‖ in 1969, deeds were delivered and recorded in 
February and March of 1970, and payment was received in February and 
October of 1970.
441
  The tax was defined with respect to amounts shown on 
federal tax returns.  Under applicable federal rules, the sales occurred on 
delivery and recordation of the deeds, not receipt of payment.
442
  Although 
the court accepted this determination of the moment of recognition, it still 
upheld the levy.
443
  The business profits tax had been adopted at a special 
session called for that purpose.
444
  It had previously been the subject of 
months-long, very public study, and refinement by a legislatively created 
task force with participation of more than 300 citizens.
445
  Its reliance on 
federal tax calculations imposed a choice among retrospectivity: a year‘s 
delay in efficacy, or presumably daunting complexities of proration.
446
  
Faced with the legislature‘s choice, the court apparently found the levy 
fundamentally fair and a practical necessity.
447
 
A later proposal to similarly back-date the scope of a gross receipts tax 
on electric utilities was declared unconstitutional, although in part because 
the utility would have been prevented from recouping its payment through 
a rate increase.
448
  The court has since cast doubt on the ―vitality‖ of the 
―reasoning and holding of Kennett,‖449 and it is almost certainly confined 
to its peculiar context. 
  
 439. 115 N.H. 50, 333 A.2d 452 (1975). 
 440. Id. at 55, 333 A.2d at 45556. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. at 5152, 333 A.2d at 453. 
 443. Id. at 5355, 333 A.2d at 45456. 
 444. Id. at 5354, 333 A.2d at 454. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
 447. The elaboration of the long, public gestation of the tax with its heavy investment of time and 
talent is superfluous except as tacit argument for fairness (no surprise) and against disrupting imple-
mentation with a judicially shortened tax year or worse.  ―Practical necessity‖ was the explanation 
offered ten years later by a skeptical court.  Cagan‘s, Inc. v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 126 N.H. 
239, 24950, 490 A.2d 1345, 1362 (1985). 
 448. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 349, 354, 461 A.2d 132, 135 (1983). 
 449. Cagan’s, Inc., 126 N.H. at 249, 490 A.2d at 1362. 
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5. Summary of Changes in the Modern Era 
The modern era opened with approval of a product-specific sales tax 
shocking to judges steeped in the philosophy of earlier times.  To justify 
this change, the court drew on sweeping language about the legislative 
power of classification based on the pre-1903 single-rate system.  It tenta-
tively undertook to define the ―the legal requirements of classification‖450 
under the power given in 1903 and skeptically deflected proposals for dif-
fering taxes on the sale of sub-classes of ordinary goods or services.  The 
suggestion that there might be some basic form of sales tax was last sig-
naled in 1971.
451
  The notion that there were a few broad classes of taxes 





  The income tax opinions validated numerous classifications 
with differing rates, merely requiring a ―rational basis.‖454  The old propo-
sition that ―[a]ll taxes that can be made proportional must be so as-
sessed‖455 has been stood on its head.  It now seems no tax levied on a dis-
tinct class need be proportional to any other.  Only when the court has con-
sidered two income classes to be essentially the same
456
 or found a class 
irrationally under-inclusive
457
 has it constrained legislative discretion in 
creating classes of taxable property.  While sometimes treating exemptions 
in the old way, as indirect expenditures to be justified under the protective 
power,
458
 the court more often treated exemption as a variety of classifica-
tion, justifiable on any rational ground,
459
 sometimes even presuming an 
unstated rational ground.
460
  This period also saw greater resort to ―fees‖ 
  
 450. Havens v. Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 117, 14 A.2d 636, 638 (1940). 
 451. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 132, 276 A.2d 817, 818 (1971). 
 452. ―[A]ll taxes of a given class must be laid at a common rate . . . annual taxes upon estates . . . 
inheritance taxes . . . [and] the taxation of incomes.‖  Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570, 138 A. 
284, 289 (1927); accord Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 557, 571, 149 A. 321, 327 (1930). 
 453. ―All income taxes must be laid at a common rate.‖  Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 545, 
81 A.2d 851, 853 (1951). 
 454. N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. State, 157 N.H. 15, 19, 943 A.2d 786, 790 (2008); see Opinion of 
the Justices, 117 N.H. 512, 518, 374 A.2d 964, 968 (1977) (capital gains at differing rate); Opinion of 
the Justices, 110 N.H. 117, 124, 262 A.2d 290, 296 (1970) (approval of the BPT).  The shift from New 
Hampshire‘s traditional language (just distinction, just ground) to ―rational basis‖ apparently occurred 
in Cagan’s, Inc.  See 126 N.H. at 246, 490 A.2d at 1359. 
 455. Thompson v. Kidder, 74 N.H. 89, 96, 65 A. 392, 396 (1906). 
 456. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 344, 347, 461 A.2d 129, 130 (1983); Opinion of the Justices, 
123 N.H. 296, 302, 460 A.2d 93, 98 (1983). 
 457. Verizon New England, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 156 N.H. 624, 639, 940 A.2d 237, 244 (2007); 
Cagan’s, Inc., 126 N.H. at 246, 490 A.2d at 1359. 
 458. ―[A] public benefit conferred by the exemption may be sufficient to render it constitutional.‖  In 
re Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 324, 911 A.2d 1, 9 (2006).  See also Opinion of the Justices, 144 
N.H. 374, 382, 746 A.2d 981, 987 (1999) (upholding exemption as a permissible public expenditure). 
 459. See, e.g., N. Country Envtl. Servs., 157 N.H. at 20, 943 A.2d at 790; Smith v. N.H. Dep‘t of 
Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 687, 692 A.2d 486, 491 (1997). 
 460. Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 117, 124, 262 A.2d 290, 296 (1970) (―might be thought‖). 
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for recovering the costs of governmental activity, and judicial elaboration 




III.  A MODERN APPROACH: SORTING OUT THE CONCEPTS 
Limits on the legislature‘s powers, both overall and with respect to 
taxation, are rooted in particular constitutional passages and concepts.  
Given the founders‘ discursive style, the passages sometimes overlap and 
the concepts are expressed in differing terms.  A problem can often be ap-
proached in several ways.  For example, a highly selective tax may be at-
tacked as violating equal protection, lacking reason, creating an improper 
classification, and being disproportional.  An exemption may similarly be 
attacked on all those grounds, as well as for being an application of public 
resources to private purposes. 
Arguments by litigants and questions from the other branches of gov-
ernment take any of these approaches, singly or in combination.  Conse-
quently, some of the court‘s opinions address a problem on narrow or un-
common grounds,
462
 while others blend the arguments in conclusory lan-
guage or cite constitutional provisions and lines of cases en masse.  There 
are nearly two centuries of judicial gloss.  In the
 
nineteenth century, the 
court created a workable synthesis faithful to the founders‘ philosophic 
language.  The constitutional amendment of 1903 was irreconcilable with 
part of that synthesis, but, as it labored for decades to resolve the resulting 
tension, the court cited the old cases and used the same language in an in-
creasingly different context.  Key words have been repeatedly used in mul-
tiple senses.  What follows is an effort to distinguish and describe the cur-
rent applications of the most important concepts and restate them more 
simply. 
A. Public Purpose, Equality, Reason 
The first question arising when a tax is imposed is ―whether the pur-
pose of such burden may properly be considered public.‖463  Further, ―[a]ll 
  
 461. See, e.g., D‘Antoni v. Comm‘r, N.H. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 153 N.H. 655, 658, 917 
A.2d 177, 180 (2006).  The scope and limits of non-tax revenue powers will be addressed in a forth-
coming article. 
 462. For example, see In re Town of Bethlehem, where the town rested its equality arguments on part 
I, article 10, neglecting articles 1 and 12.  154 N.H. at 318, 911 A.2d at 4. 
 463. Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 10, 146 A. 511, 516 (1929) (quoting Berlin 
Mills Co. v. Wentworth‘s Location, 60 N.H. 156, 157 (1880)). 
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taxation must be equal.‖464  However, ―[e]qual protection permits classifi-
cations that are reasonable and not arbitrary and have a rational relation to 
the public purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation involved.‖465  In 
actual cases, these three concepts are inextricably related.  A rational dis-
tinction made for a public purpose does not violate the principle of equali-
ty.  Conversely, if a tax or exemption treats similarly situated persons dif-
ferently, it either improperly favors one class for private benefit (violating 
several articles of the Bill of Rights),
466
 or is irrational (violating the limit 
on legislative power in part II, article 5),
467
 or both.  If a particular tax is 
irrational, it either lacks a public purpose, or unequally burdens those sub-
ject to it, or both.
468
 
Respect for the legislative branch and the presumption of validity 
mean that the reason and public purpose requirements are often phrased in 
the negative.  A distinction or classification will be upheld ―as long as ‗the 
proposed selection is not arbitrarily made or for the sole purpose of prefer-
ring some taxpayers to others.‘‖469  Coupling these requirements permits 
the court to avoid impugning legislative motives while preventing invi-
dious discrimination.  Thus, in Claremont School District v. Governor,
470
 
the court conceded that the stated legislative motive for a transitional ex-
emption from the statewide school tax to taxpayers of some towns (avoid-
ance of foreclosures, bankruptcies, etc.) was a proper purpose.
471
  Howev-
er, to extend the exemption to everyone in the ―property rich‖ communities 
rather than the minority who might face hardship from an immediate tax 
increase was ―so arbitrary as to serve no useful purpose of a public nature‖ 
and ―unreasonable.‖472 
Similarly, tax relief for low and moderate income homeowners was 
―directed toward a legitimate public purpose‖ in Felder v. City of 
  
 464. State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 114, 18 A. 878, 879 (1889) (citing seventeen prior cases). 
 465. Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. 270, 277, 627 A.2d 92, 96 (1993). 
 466. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 1 (1784) (―[G]overnment . . . instituted for the general good.‖); id. pt. I, 
art. 10 (―Government being instituted for the common benefit . . . and not for the private interest . . . of 
any . . . class of men.‖); id. pt. I, art. 12 (explaining that protection and taxation are reciprocal); id. pt. 
II, art. 6 (confining taxation to the ―public charges of government‖). 
 467. Id. pt. II, art. 5 (authority granted to general court ―to make . . . reasonable laws . . . and levy 
proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes‖). 
 468. At the hypothetical extreme these concepts logically could separate.  A wholly irrational tax 
might be levied on all, or a rational one for an illegitimate purpose, but the general rule seems sufficient 
for the decided cases and any that could be reasonably anticipated. 
 469. Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 383, 746 A.2d 981, 988 (1999).  This quotation is found 
in at least four other Opinions of the Justices.  Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 95, 99, 697 A.2d 120, 
123 (1997); Opinion of the Justices, 137 N.H. at 275, 627 A.2d at 95; Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 
543, 544, 81 A.2d 851, 852 (1951); Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 533, 536, 81 A.2d 845, 849 
(1951). 
 470. 144 N.H. 210, 744 A.2d 1107 (1999). 
 471. Id. at 21617, 744 A.2d at 1111. 
 472. Id. 
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Portsmouth,
473
 but the mechanism irrationally discriminated against those 
very groups.
474
  A dubious proposal to exempt wine and liquor dealers 
from the business profits tax could be deflected by indicating that no ―just 
reason‖ had yet been articulated.475 
While public purpose/reason analysis is routine in challenges to ex-
emptions, it occasionally defeats a tax.  Utilities seem to inspire particular 
legislative attention.  They may, of course, be separately taxed on their 
franchises, their income,
476
 or their gross receipts.
477
  The tax, however, 
must be rational.  In 1957, the franchise tax on electric utilities was de-
clared unconstitutional on the sole ground that the statutory valuation for-
mula (which guaranteed overvaluation) was ―illogical and unjust.‖478  A 
later proposal to levy a state property tax on electric plants capable of ge-
nerating 500 megawatts or more would have reached only one facility, the 
Seabrook nuclear plant.
479
  While the court speculated that nuclear power 
generation might justify a special classification, capacity alone did not, and 




In 1982, a lucrative administrative interpretation of the utility income 
tax had to be overturned because its application would mean the statutory 
formula would ―not bear a rational relationship to economic reality.‖481  
When the City of Rochester taxed Verizon New England‘s use of public 
ways without taxing similar use by other utilities, it lost on equal protec-
tion despite the application of minimum scrutiny.
482
  The city had offered, 
and the court could conceive of, ―no rational reason for selectively impos-
ing‖ the tax and no ―legitimate governmental interest . . . furthered by [the] 
disparate treatment.‖483 
These requirements operate within taxing districts.  So long as they are 
uniform in the taxing district,
484
 taxes and exemptions can be subject to 
  
 473. 114 N.H. 573, 324 A.2d 708 (1974). 
 474. Id. at 57879, 324 A.2d at 711. 
 475. Opinion of the Justices, 115 N.H. 306, 309, 339 A.2d 450, 452 (1975). 
 476. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 549, 137 A.2d 726 (1958). 
 477. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 349, 461 A.2d 132 (1983). 
 478. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 101 N.H. 154, 162-63, 136 A.2d 600, 606–07 (1957). 
 479. Opinion  of the Justices, 118 N.H. at 345–46, 386 A.2d at 1275. 
 480. Id. at 346, 386 A.2d at 1275. 
 481. In re Public Service Co. of N.H., 122 N.H. 919, 925, 451 A.2d 1321, 1325 (1982). 
 482. Verizon New England, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 156 N.H. 624, 631, 940 A.2d 237, 244 (2007). 
 483. Id. 
 484. Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 380, 746 A.2d 981, 986 (1999) (municipal exemptions 
for utility personal property); Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 95, 97, 697 A.2d 120, 122 (1997) 
(municipal exemptions for industrial construction). 
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local option.  The legislature frequently provides that cities and towns may 
adopt particular exemptions from local taxes.
485
 
No unconstitutional delegation of authority results when the legis-
lature establishes the terms of a general act, but leaves the deter-
mination of whether it shall have the force of law to the governing 
bodies of the localities to be affected or to the people themselves.  
Constitutionally mandated requirements for uniformity and equali-
ty of taxation would not be violated should less than all cities and 
towns adopt the optional exemptions provided by the bill, with a 




Proportionality is used in different ways in the cases, inviting confu-
sion.  Sometimes it refers to part I, article 12: ―Every member of the com-
munity has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, 
and property; he is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense 
of such protection.‖  In Smith v. New Hampshire Department of Revenue 
Administration, the court said this passage ―literally imposes a requirement 
of proportionality of a taxpayer's portion of the public expense, according 
to the amount of his taxable estate, and requires that similarly situated tax-
payers be treated the same.‖487  Paradoxically, however, the same opinion 
continues that ―[s]trictly speaking, the rule of equality and proportionality 
does not apply to the selection of the subjects of taxation, provided just 
reasons exist for the selection made.‖488  Thus, one kind of proportionality 
is constitutionally required, but another is not.  The state and current court 
have not been well served by loose use of the word in many older opinions. 
―Proportionality‖ or ―disproportionate‖ appear in the cases in at least 
four senses: (1) equal protection claims about selection and classification 
of the subjects of taxation or exemption; (2) the requirement of uniform 
rates and valuations in the design of a particular tax; (3) the possible re-
quirement that different taxes of the same type have the same rate; and (4) 
  
 485. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:1-c (2008) (optional collection of Resident Tax); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 72:28 (standard and optional Veterans‘ Tax Credit); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:29-a 
(surviving spouse); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:37-b (exemption for the disabled); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 72:62 (exemption for solar energy systems); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:66 (exemption for 
wind-powered energy systems); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:76 (property tax exemption for new com-
mercial or industrial uses). 
 486. Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. at 10001, 697 A.2d at 124 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted); accord Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. at 379, 746 A.2d at 986. 
 487. 141 N.H. 681, 686, 692 A.2d 486, 491 (1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 488. Id.  The Court quoted this language as recently as 2008 in North Country Environmental Servic-
es, 157 N.H. 15, 19, 943 A.2d 786, 790 (2008). 
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taxpayer challenges to their assessments under a tax that is constitutional 
but misapplied in their cases. 
Since 1903, part I, article 12 should be primarily understood in the first 
of these senses, although it has some bearing on the fourth.  While the pro-
vision that each ―contribute his share‖ is obviously directed toward fairness 
in taxation, it does not contain the word proportionality.  There is no for-
mula by which a just ―share‖ of the expense of protecting ―life, liberty, and 
property‖ can be calculated.  Relative benefits enjoyed, needs for protec-
tion, ability to pay, practicality of enforcement, costs of collection, etc., 
lurk in this general expression of the social contract.  Balancing these fac-
tors ―is not a judicial question.‖489 
Under the single-rate system, the court could force a sort of overall 
proportionality once the legislature selected the objects of taxation, but it is 
impossible in a system of layered classes.  This provision is now simply an 
emphatic and specific expression of the general principle of equality found 
in other parts of the Bill of Rights.
490
  Translating it into proportionality 
adds nothing to public purpose, equal treatment, and reason.  ―The reasons 
which may justify the use of the selective power as to the subjects for taxa-
tion may be as various as the motives which induce any rational action,‖491 
and ―similarly situated taxpayers [must] be treated similarly.‖492 
The second sense is a textually-based and distinct limitation.  Article 5 
of part II actually uses the word proportional, empowering the legislature 
to ―impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and 
taxes . . . .‖  This provision has always been applied to the structure of 
particular tax laws.  Except for polls, all taxes are on property.  Part II, 
article 5 proportionality requires taxes to be proportional to the value of the 
property—i.e., ad valorem.  That requires a uniform rate and uniform valu-
ation.
493
  The rate may not be varied on the basis of a personal characteris-
tic of the taxpayer such as relative wealth.
494
  The word ―reasonable‖ quali-
fies the mathematical requirement, authorizing exemptions for just 
cause.
495
  This is one source of confusion.  An unjustified exemption vi-
  
 489. Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 55556 (1879). 
 490. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 1, 2, 10 (1784). 
 491. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 509, 52 A.2d 294, 296 (1947). 
 492. Starr v. Governor, 148 N.H. 72, 74, 802 A.2d 1227, 1229 (2002). 
 493. In re Town of Rindge (N.H. Dep‘t of Envtl. Servs.), 158 N.H. 21, 26, 959 A.2d 188, 192 (2008); 
N. Country Envtl. Servs., 157 N.H. at 19, 943 A.2d at 790; Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 378, 
746 A.2d 981, 985 (1999); Opinion of the Justices, 142 N.H. 95, 101, 697 A.2d 120, 124 (1997); Smith 
v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 68586, 692 A.2d 486, 490 (1997); Opinion of the 
Justices, 131 N.H. 640, 643, 557 A.2d 273, 275 (1989). 
 494. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 525, 527, 113 A.2d 547, 548 (1955) (basing state income tax on 
a percentage of federal tax paid discriminates among taxpayers). 
 495. See generally Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565 (1829), criticized by Trs. of Phillips Exeter 
Acad., 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940). 
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olates part II, article 5 proportionality, but exemption is often conflated 
with classification of property (part II, article 6) or approached as merely a 
matter of equal protection.  If the same criteria and standards of review 
prevailed in all cases, this untidiness would be harmless.  However, as ex-
plained below, some exemptions are based on the protective power, includ-
ing some defined by personal characteristics that are forbidden as bases for 
a classification of property.  It is also possible that different standards of 
review are or should be applied in these different contexts. 
The third sense, that different taxes of the same type have the same 
rate, may be obsolete.  At one time, the court held that there were classes 
of taxes, and that ―all taxes of a given class must be laid at a common 
rate.‖496  ―The object in requiring the use of a common rate [was] to insure 
the imposition of a proportionate burden.‖497  It was said as recently as 
1951 that ―[a]ll income taxes must be laid at a common rate,‖498 but the-
reafter the types of income taxable at different rates multiplied as the court 
approved various classifications.
499
  In evaluating possible taxes on sales of 
goods or services, the court seems to have resolved the issue by merging 
the concept of classes of taxes with classification of property so that all 
property not properly distinguishable would necessarily be taxed propor-
tionally because it would have to be in one class.
500
  As part II, article 6 
speaks only of classes of property, not classes of taxes, this seems the cor-
rect approach. 
The fourth use of proportionality in the tax cases involves dispropor-
tionate assessment of a taxpayer‘s property under a valid tax.  To secure 
abatement, the taxpayer must show his appraisal is above the average of 
other property of the same class in the taxing district.
501
  The process dates 
back to the nineteenth century when the court treated uniformity, equality, 
and proportionality as general principles without specifying particular con-
stitutional provisions.
502
  This usage could be grounded in part I or part II 
  
 496. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570, 138 A. 284, 289 (1927). 
 497. Id. at 567, 138 A. at 288. 
 498. Opinion of the Justices, 97 N.H. 543, 545, 81 A.2d 851, 853 (1951). 
 499. See supra Parts II.D.4 & 7. 
 500. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 206, 209, 278 A.2d 348, 350 (1971); see also Opinion of the 
Justices, 97 N.H. at 546, 81 A.2d at 853. 
 501. In re Town of Sunapee (N.H. Bd. of Tax & Land Appeals), 126 N.H. 214, 217, 489 A.2d 153, 
155 (1985); Berthiaume v. City of Nashua, 118 N.H. 646, 648, 392 A.2d 143, 144 (1978); Rollins v. 
City of Dover, 93 N.H. 448, 450, 44 A.2d 113, 114 (1945).  The modern cases involve real estate, but 
the principle would also apply if, for example, a particular railroad or utility franchise or income stream 
were overvalued in comparison to others.  See, e.g., Wyatt v. State Bd. of Equalization, 74 N.H. 552, 
554, 70 A. 387, 389 (1908). 
 502. E.g., Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. City of Manchester, 70 N.H. 336, 345, 47 A. 74, 74 (1900) (―the 
constitutional rule of equality‖); Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. City of Manchester, 70 N.H. 200, 204, 46 A. 
470, 472 (1900) (―the constitutional rule of equality requires a proportional and equal valuation‖). 
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of the constitution, but it deals only with the application of proportionality 
to the administration of a valid tax, not a limit on legislative authority.  The 
distinction was recently made in Verizon New England, Inc. v. City of 
Rochester, where the tax failed on equal protection grounds as irrationally 
under-inclusive without any need to show that the taxpayer‘s total assess-




The term proportionality seems best confined to the second and fourth 
senses in which it is used: the requirement of uniform rates and valuations 
in the design of a particular tax, and taxpayer challenges to their assess-
ments under a tax that is constitutional but misapplied in their cases. 
 
C. Selection and Classification 
When all taxes but polls were on estates, at one rate and uniform val-
uation in each taxing district, the legislature had one choice—to tax or not.   
Excises were forbidden, but in selecting property subject to taxation, legis-
lative discretion was supreme and limited only by a requirement that it be 
―reasonable.‖504  As the constitution prohibits any taxation without legisla-
tive authority,
505
 the limit was largely theoretical in some cases because the 
state supreme court‘s only option for an under-inclusive tax was (and re-
mains) to strike down the entire tax.
506
  It could strike an express exemp-
tion (leaving the general taxing provision in place), but not a tacit one.
507
  




In the modern era the real property tax remains inclusive, subject only 
to express exemptions.
509
  Other levies occur under specific statutes defin-
ing the property to be taxed.  Some of these treat personal property as real-
ty for taxation purposes, which is permissible.
510
  The modern cases still 
refer to the ―selection of the subjects of taxation,‖ but in the context of 
  
 503. 156 N.H. 624, 629, 940 A.2d 237, 24243 (2007). 
 504. See generally Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565 (1829). 
 505. N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 28 (1784). 
 506. See generally Eyers Woolen Co. v. Town of Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 28–29, 146 A. 511, 525 (1929). 
 507. Id. 
 508. See, e.g., Brewster v. Hough, 10 N.H. 138 (1839). 
 509. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72:6 (2008). 
 510. ―[T]he Legislature, by proper classification, has the power to make any kind of property perso-
nalty for the purposes of taxation, though it is real estate by the common law and for all other purposes, 
and vice versa.‖  Kolodny v. Laconia, 96 N.H. 337, 338, 72 A.2d 507, 508 (1950); accord In re Town 
of Pelham, 143 N.H. 536, 538, 736 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1999). 
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classification under part II, article 6 as amended in 1903.
511
  The require-
ments in principle are the same—taxation only of property and reason in 
selection.  The legislature has ―broad power to declare property to be taxa-
ble or non-taxable based upon a classification of the property‘s kind or use, 
but not based upon a classification of the property‘s owner.‖512 
The oft-repeated prohibition on classification of ―owners,‖513 ―taxpay-
ers,‖514 or ―persons‖515 is a loose and misleading way of describing what 
remains of the prohibition on excise taxes.  To tax (or exempt) ownership, 
sale, severance, receipt, expenditure, etc., of a particular class of property 
necessarily classifies the taxpayers who do those things.  The tobacco tax 
classified sellers or purchasers of tobacco.  Denial to private landfill opera-
tors of an exemption for pollution control facilities classified the operators.  
Both were perfectly constitutional.
516
  Yet a tax on apples put into com-
merce was an unconstitutional occupation tax,
517
 as was one on milk distri-
bution.
518
  There is more to this than minimum-rationality equal protec-
tion—all of the distinctions are in some sense rational. 
Taxation that meets the requirements of public purpose, equality, and 
reason can still fail.  New Hampshire‘s classification power in taxation is 
narrower than it is in ordinary economic regulation, because the legislature 
may only tax ―polls, estates, and other classes of property.‖519  Pure excise 
taxes remain ultra vires.  Since 1903, some of the appearance and effect of 
the forbidden excise can be achieved by classification of ―property in mo-
tion,‖ but not all.  The state may not directly tax the exercise of an occupa-
tion, nor some act.  Charges on those things must be justified under some 
other power, such as cost recovery fees or police power penalties.
520
  How-
ever, the state may identify a class of property defined in part by some 
event and require a person associated with that property and event to pay 
the tax. 
  
 511. N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. State, 157 N.H. 15, 19, 943 A.2d 786, 790 (2008); Smith v. N.H. 
Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 687, 692 A.2d 486, 491 (1997). 
 512. N. Country Envtl., 157 N.H. at 19, 943 A.2d at 790 (quoting Smith, 141 N.H. at 686, 692 A.2d at 
491). 
 513. Id.; see also Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 344, 348, 461 A.2d 129, 131 (1983) (quoting 
Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 569, 149 A. 321, 326 (1930)). 
 514. Opinion of the Justices, 106 N.H. 202, 206, 208 A.2d 458, 46162 (1965) (quoting Opinion of 
the Justices 84 N.H. 559, 569, 149 A. 321, 326 (1930)). 
 515. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 89 N.H. 21, 28, 192 A. 297, 301 (1937). 
 516. See N. Country Envtl., 157 N.H. at 26, 943 A.2d at 795 (privately operated landfills); Havens v. 
Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 116,14 A.2d 636, 637 (1940) (tobacco). 
 517. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 555, 556, 65 A.2d 876, 877 (1949). 
 518. Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.H. 527, 529, 96, A.2d 733, 734–35 (1953). 
 519. N.H. CONST. pt II, art. 6 (1784). 
 520. The principal non-tax revenue powers will be the subject of a forthcoming article.  They are 
subject to their own constitutional limits on structure, amount, purpose, etc.  See, e.g., D‘Antoni v. 
Comm‘r, N.H. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs. 153 N.H. 655, 917 A.2d 177 (2006). 
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There are two ways taxes may fail as classifications of property no 
matter how rational they are in the equal protection sense.  The most ob-
vious is to make taxability or tax rate depend on a characteristic of the tax-
payer unrelated to the definition of the class of property.  Thus, taxing the 
income of only corporations is forbidden.
521
  Graduation is forbidden—it 
amounts to classification on the basis of wealth rather than qualities of the 
taxed property.  ―A tax levy cannot be sustained here upon any theory that 
the richer one is the higher his tax rate should be.  All taxes on like proper-
ty and for like purposes must be equal.‖522  Taxation of business profits 
that would vary with the labor intensity of taxpayers‘ business or the tax-
payer‘s size or legal structure would unconstitutionally ―result in two 
classes of taxpayers, paying differing rates of tax on essentially the same 
class of property.‖523  This has nothing to do with the number of taxpayers 
linked to the property.  Taxing unusual forms of property that may be uni-
quely valuable to only one or a few persons in a particular business is not 
necessarily an improper classification.
524
  Nor is taxing a type of property 
distinctively used by only two entities in the state.
525
  The state supreme 
court is ―not concerned with the number of properties within a particular 
group, but with whether the distinction drawn between the taxable and 
nontaxable properties is a proper one, in that it is sufficiently inclusive to 
create distinctive classes.‖526 
The other form of forbidden excise involves under-inclusive classifica-
tion—a tax on property used in or generated by a particular industry or 
group that is not sufficiently and meaningfully distinguishable from similar 
property of other industries or groups.  This is why the apple and milk tax-
es were forbidden ―occupation‖ taxes.  While making the distinction is 
essential to preserving a fundamental constitutional limit, at least with re-
gard to commodity taxes, it is not easy.  Commercially produced apples 
were too narrow a class,
527
 but severed timber was not.
528
  Receipts on sale 
of bottled soft drinks were once approved as a class,
529
 but the income of 
milk distributors apparently was not.
530
  Tobacco sold for human consump-
  
 521. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 206, 209, 278 A.2d 348, 350 (1971). 
 522. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 525, 527, 113 A.2d 547, 548 (1955) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571, 149 A. 321, 328 (1930)). 
 523. Opinion of the Justices, 123 N.H. 296, 302, 460 A.2d 93, 97 (1983). 
 524. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Town of Hudson, 145 N.H. 598, 604, 766 A.2d 672, 677 (2000) 
(pipeline easement). 
 525. See N. Country Envtl. Servs. v. State, 157 N.H. 15, 28, 943 A.2d 786, 797 (2008) (privately 
operated landfills). 
 526. Id. at 20, 943 A.2d at 791. 
 527. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 555, 556, 65 A.2d 876, 877 (1949). 
 528. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 575, 149 A. 321, 329 (1930). 
 529. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 506, 509, 52 A.2d 294, 296 (1947). 
 530. Opinion of the Justices, 98 N.H. 527, 529, 96 A.2d 733, 734–35 (1953). 
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tion and refined petroleum products are in classes by themselves.
531
  The 
state supreme court has repeatedly warned of the ―danger of creating, by 
narrow classification, a tax upon occupations or privileges,‖532 and propos-
als for narrow sales or service taxes seem to have waned.  However, if they 
recur, the state supreme court may have to again take up the sketchy law 
on the ―legal requirements of classification.‖533  The language of the deci-
sions along this difficult boundary has ranged from broadly deferential to 
legislative discretion to harshly peremptory. 
Most classifications are justified at the equal protection level as ration-
al distinctions with a public purpose.  However, the limitation of taxing 
authority to classes of property is an additional restriction.  Classification 
turning on personal characteristics unrelated to the property taxed is only 
permissible through police power exemptions, as described below.  Narrow 
classification by specific products, services, or industries is inherently sus-
pect, and the state supreme court has in fact required something more than 
minimum rationality to avoid it being treated as an impermissible occupa-
tion tax. 
D. Exemptions 
While some exemptions are a form of classification, some are not.  It is 
better to keep the terms distinct.  As described in the cases, exemptions can 
be tacit or expressed.  Expressed exemptions may be justified as matters of 
administrative practicality, as a way of defining a class of taxable property, 
as a way of avoiding double taxation (which is a special case of the classi-
fication power), and as exercises of the police/protective power.  All of 
these must meet the requirements of public purpose, equality, and reason, 
but only the last may legitimately discriminate on the basis of personal 
characteristics unrelated to the definition of the property taxed or ex-
empted. 
Tacit exemptions are those implicit in the legislature‘s choice not to 
levy a tax.  Given the nineteenth-century practice of levying the tax on 
estates both inclusively (real property) and exclusively (personal property) 
it is understandable that from the earliest times the state supreme court has 
sometimes referred to this as a form of exemption, but it led to an unre-
solved tension in the cases because at least some express exemptions were 
treated very differently. 
  
 531. Opinion of the Justices, 114 N.H. 174, 178, 317 A.2d 568, 570 (1974) (petroleum). 
 532. Opinion of the Justices, 111 N.H. 131, 135, 276 A.2d 817, 820 (1971) (quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 97 N.H. 546, 548, 81 A.2d 853, 855 (1951)). 
 533. Havens v. Att‘y Gen., 91 N.H. 115, 117, 14 A.2d 636, 638 (1940). 
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Tacit ―exemption‖ by silently excluding property from a taxable class 
is an exercise of the power to select and classify.  The line of cases saying 
selection of some property for taxation is not an exemption of other proper-
ty is the better guide.
534
  Referring to silence in the tax statutes as an ex-
emption was harmless before 1903, but now it adds confusion to the analy-
sis of exemptions.  Tacit exemption is simply a matter of selection and 
classification.  The appropriate analysis has only two levels—the selection 
of the objects of taxation must meet the requirements of public purpose, 
equal treatment, and reason, and it must define a distinct class of property 
without resort to unrelated personal characteristics of the taxpayer.  Defin-
ing a class of property with a stated exclusion, for example all income over 
$2,000, is not a tacit exemption.
535
 
Small express exemptions are sometimes permitted as matters of ad-
ministration and practicality.
536
  Most other exemptions are now treated as 
exercises of the classification power, whether in the usual form of exemp-
tions, or as ―deductions, adjustments and credits.‖537  Defining classes of 
property by carving out or adding back sub-classes is a natural and effi-
cient method.  However, add-backs or exceptions from exemptions can 
misdirect attention.  This was recently illustrated in North Country Envi-
ronmental Services v. State.
538
  The taxpayer operated a landfill—it had 
previously taken advantage of an exemption for pollution control facilities 
from the real property tax.
539
  In 2006 the legislature amended the relevant 
exemption statute prospectively to except privately owned landfills.
540
  The 
taxpayer, one of only two in the state then affected by the statute, argued 
discrimination and disproportion, but the state supreme court held that pol-
lution-control facilities associated with landfills were a distinct class of 
property based on use, and that denial of exemption was rationally related 
to a declared legislative purpose to discourage that method of waste dis-
posal.
541
  As reasonable as this approach was, it seems more a response to 
  
 534. ―The non-assessment of other classes of property would not be an exemption of any class of 
people.‖  Morrison v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 538, 556 (1879). 
 535. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. 561, 570, 138 A. 284, 290 (1927). 
 536. See Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 500, 510, 190 A. 801, 808 (1937) (implying that a nominal 
amount of an estate could be exempted, presumably because it would not be worth the costs of collec-
tion).  A ―discount‖ on tax stamps allowed to wholesale tobacco distributors was justified to reduce 
evasion and increase efficiency of supervision.  Havens, 91 N.H. at 119–20, 14 A.2d at 639.  An ex-
emption to compensate retailers for collecting sales tax was permissible although not required.  Opinion 
of the Justices, 97 N.H. 533, 539, 81 A.2d 845, 851 (1951). 
 537. Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783, 584 A.2d 1342, 1346 (1990) (quoting Opinion of the 
Justices, 131 N.H. 640, 642, 557 A.2d 273, 275 (1989)). 
 538. 157 N.H. 15, 943 A.2d 786 (2008). 
 539. In re Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 324–25, 911 A.2d 1, 9–10 (2006). 
 540. N. Country Envtl., 157 N.H. at 17, 943 A.2d at 789. 
 541. Id. at 24–25, 943 A.2d at 794. 
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the taxpayer‘s sense of grievance than a necessary holding.  The exception 
simply restored the taxability of the property at the same rate as all other 
realty.  The real question was whether the remaining exemption for other 
sorts of pollution control facilities was constitutional.  If there were a prop-
er purpose in encouraging them as a distinct class, a reason to discourage 
other activities was superfluous. 
Perhaps most exemptions other than those to avoid double taxation are 
grounded in the protective/police power.  Their effect is to encourage cer-
tain activity or aid particular persons.  It may not matter if those exemp-
tions designed to encourage certain uses of property are treated as classifi-
cations, but there are some express exemptions that should not be.  Exemp-
tions based on personal characteristics unrelated to the taxed property—
age, wealth, disability, family relationship, form of business organiza-
tion—are not exercises of the power to select objects of taxation.  It is axi-
omatic that the power to classify and select objects of taxation is confined 
to property: ―the legislature may not classify owners for differing taxa-
tion.‖542  Taxing or not on the basis of personal characteristics or activities 
unrelated to the taxed property is at the heart of the forbidden excise pow-
er.  Taxing the wealthy as such may be progressive, but it is unconstitu-
tional in New Hampshire.  The state supreme court long ago observed that 
a quantitative exemption to an income tax could be forbidden graduation, 
and a tax ―cannot be sustained here upon any theory that the richer one is 
the higher his tax rate should be.‖543 
Personal exemptions have historically required an explicit protective 
power justification, such as relief of actual poverty, and the state supreme 
court has usually made an independent judgment about the effect of the 
exemption.
544
  Yet the modern state supreme court has sometimes applied 
the minimal scrutiny that originated in generic classification cases to per-
sonal exemptions.
545
  The difference is shown in the treatment of age-based 
exemptions to the IDT in 1963.  The state supreme court made do with a 
vague reference to ―some common attributes‖ of age and poverty and then 
simply listed a series of statutes that drew lines for various purposes at age 
  
 542. Id. at 23, 943 A.2d at 793. 
 543. Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H. 559, 571, 149 A. 321, 328 (1930).  Quantitative exemptions 
always introduce graduation in effective rates.  For example, under a 5% income tax with a $1,000 
exemption, a person earning $1,100 pays $5, an effective rate of 0.45%, while one earning $2,000 pays 
$50, an effective rate of 2.5%. 
 544. See id. 
 545. Most recently in sustaining inheritance tax exemptions based on family relationship.  Estate of 
Robitaille v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 149 N.H. 595, 599, 827 A.2d 981, 985 (2003). 
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65 or 70.
546
  Age-related distinctions were rational in taxation because they 
existed for other purposes.  Whether from laxity or naïveté, that decision 
has left us with working families having substantial savings subsidizing (to 
a modest degree) some much wealthier elders.
547
  The state supreme court 
of 1930 would have insisted on a means test or some alternate justification 
under the protective power.  Opinions on age-based exemptions since 1963 
have involved proposals with a means test, so it is unclear whether the state 
supreme court would return to its traditional position on quantitative ex-
emptions. 
As with the ―occupation tax‖ problem in classification, the tests for 
protective power exemptions, particularly those based on personal charac-
teristics, are unclear.  General language lumping all forms of classification 
and exemption together is common, sometimes with language suggesting 
minimum scrutiny.  In other cases there is different language and what 
appears to be a higher threshold.  It is possible the state supreme court is 
once again prepared to require more than minimum rationality for all ex-
press exemptions.  There is a discernible difference in the tone in some of 
the most recent cases.  While the ―rational basis test‖ has been invoked as 
recently as 2003,
548
 there is another line of cases coming down to 2008 
speaking of ―just reasons‖ that ―reasonably promote some proper object of 
public welfare or interest.‖549 
E. Justice 
The word ―just‖ does not appear in any of the constitutional provisions 
bearing on taxation.  The term entered the case law in 1829 when the court 
said that ―reasonable‖ in part II, article 5 ―seems to be used as having the 
same meaning with the word just.‖550  This was in the context of explaining 
and justifying legislative discretion to deviate from strict mathematical 




A tax of a particular sum, upon every poll in the state, might be easily 
laid, and would be, in one sense of the term, a proportional tax.  But no 
  
 546. Opinion of the Justices, 105 N.H. 22, 24, 192 A.2d 22, 23 (1963).  The same rationale was 
quoted verbatim to support property tax exemptions in Opinion of the Justices, 110 N.H. 206, 208, 266 
A.2d 111, 113 (1970), but that exemption was means-tested. 
 547. The current extra exemption at age 65 is $1,200.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:5 (2009).  Age-
related exemptions for residential property have justifications other than poverty. 
 548. Robitaille, 149 N.H. at 596, 827 A.2d at 983.  The actual scrutiny in this case seems to have 
been a bit more robust. 
 549. In re Town of Rindge, 158 N.H. 21, 26 (2008) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 
378, 746 A.2d 981, 985 (1999)). 
 550. Opinion of the Court, 4 N.H. 565, 569 (1829). 
 551. Id. at 570. 
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person would suppose that such a tax would be just and reasonable.  ―No 
one would think, that the polls of children, in their earliest infancy, or of 
idiots and distracted persons, were proper subjects of taxation.‖552 
The classification and exemption powers are now fully developed.  Yet 
the state supreme court has repeatedly included the term ―just‖ in lists of 
requirements as if it were an independent limitation: ―taxation [must] be 
just, uniform, equal, and proportional.‖553  There are variations of this—
some free-floating and some attributed to part II, article 5.
554
 
An exercise of the taxing power that meets all the other constitutional 
requirements is necessarily ―just‖ as far as judicial review is concerned.  
Such a protean term, now unnecessary in its original context, can only con-
fuse litigants and the public.  The state supreme court is frequently at pains 
to explain it has nothing to do with the wisdom of otherwise valid legisla-
tion, but this repeated inclusion of an extra-constitutional word in lists of 
constitutional requirements needlessly invites a contrary inference. 
F. Standards of Review 
Sometimes standards of review are not articulated in the modern taxa-
tion cases.  When they are, they are not in entirely consistent language, in 
part because the same issue can be and often is characterized in a variety of 
ways.  Even when the language and issues are parallel, it is difficult to re-
concile the outcomes in all the cases.  This situation was not improved 
when the three-tier federal approach to equal protection began to be ap-
plied in some tax cases
555
 during a period when the chief justice expressed 
concern over ―the confusion in our standards of constitutional review.‖556  
While I believe some of the limitations on the taxing power should be and 
have been maintained with special scrutiny, an analysis and critique of 
standards of review in constitutional challenges to New Hampshire tax 
legislation will require a separate article. 
  
 552. Id. 
 553. Smith v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 141 N.H. 681, 686, 692 A.2d 486, 491 (1997). 
 554. ―[E]qual in valuation and uniform in rate, and just.‖  In re Town of Rindge, 158 N.H. at 24, 959 
A.2d at 192 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. at 378, 746 A.2d at 985); Starr v. Governor, 148 
N.H. 72, 74, 802 A.2d 1227, 1230 (2002); Opinion of the Justices, 131 N.H. 640, 642, 557 A.2d 273, 
275 (1989). 
 555. See Cagan‘s, Inc. v. N.H. Dep‘t of Revenue Admin., 126 N.H. 239 (1985). 
 556. Gonya v. Comm‘r, N.H. Ins. Dep‘t, 153 N.H. 521, 538, 899 A.2d 278, 292 (2006) (Broderick, 
C.J., concurring); see also Dover v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 133 N.H. 109, 121, 575 A.2d 1280, 
1287 (1990) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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G. Modern Rules Summarized 
The modern law can be summarized in fairly simple and precise terms 
without the cascade of overlapping, multifarious, and redundant terms that 
have accumulated over two centuries.  Each of the following propositions 
is supported by decisions in the modern era, and none has been repudiated. 
While the legislature has great discretion in selecting the objects and 
methods of taxation, all tax legislation must meet the requirements of pub-
lic purpose, equality, and reason.  The term proportional in part II, article 5 
means that every tax must be ad valorem, which requires a uniform rate 
applied to a uniform valuation for everyone paying the tax.  Classification 
for taxation has two aspects—it must be applied to property, and it must be 
rational.  So long as it is applied to property, classification under part II, 
article 6 need only meet the public purpose, equality, and reason standard.  
However, classification based on personal characteristics of the taxpayers 
unrelated to the defining characteristics of the property is not authorized.  
A narrow classification of property that fails to include similar property 
defined by the same characteristic event is possible but may fail as either 
insufficiently distinct or as an excise.  Exemptions may be used to define 
classes of property, or to determine which of two overlapping classes will 
apply when double taxation threatens.  These need only meet the public 
purpose, equality, and reason standards.  Exemptions may also be exercises 
of the protective power to encourage particular acts or aid particular per-
sons, and such exemptions are only permitted to promote some definite and 
proper object of public welfare or interests.  Taxability of property defined 
by an act or event is determined by the law at the time of the act or event. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the 1880s the New Hampshire Supreme Court developed a logical, 
elegant, and comprehensive interpretation of the constitutional limits on 
the taxing power.  One could imagine it being workable in a modern world, 
but the people soon found it too confining.  However, rather than granting 
taxing powers more like those of other states, they authorized in 1903 two 
specific new property taxes and the taxation of ―other classes of property.‖  
A large part of the old learning was thereby rendered meaningless, as the 
state supreme court gradually discovered.  Exercise of the power to define 
and tax other classes of property necessarily implied taxation of property 
based on some event, permitting something like an excise.  It also neces-
sarily involved the power to have more than one tax applied to some prop-
erty and to have different tax rates for different classes of property.  Still 
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lacking the excise power, however, the legislature must structure each new 
tax as an ad valorem property tax. 
The 1903 amendment embedded a fundamental tension in the constitu-
tion.  The nineteenth-century synthesis partially survives in the remaining 
broad language of proportionality and equality, the prohibition of excises, 
and the restriction of taxes to property and polls.  But the new power to 
create multiple classes of property taxable in different ways at disparate 
rates opens the door to unequal, perhaps invidious, tax burdens and to clas-
sifications indistinguishable from occupation or other excise taxes.  The 
fault line along which this tension is resolved in particular cases is the limit 
of the legislature‘s power to define classes of taxable property.  These are 
also the cases with the widest variation in language and outcomes.  Had the 
state supreme court adhered to its occasional position that there were only 
a few major classes of taxes, New Hampshire might have been obliged to 
adopt a general sales or income tax.  Yet that view was neither grounded in 
the constitutional language nor consistent with the state supreme court‘s 
previous declarations about the legislature‘s power to select and classify 
the objects of taxation. 
One could criticize the outcome or language of a given decision or 
urge a stricter standard of review, but each critical step in the development 
of the modern law has been logical, faithful to the language of the constitu-
tion, and supportable by reference to earlier decisions.  A regime where 
everyone who was taxed was taxed the same way and at the same rate has, 
by the probably unforeseen implications of a vague phrase, been utterly 
transformed. 
